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INTRODUCTION

It is widely agreed among lawyers. judges, and technologists that of all the
challenges associated with the discovery of electronically stored information
(ESI) in civil litigation, the most vexing is the sheer volume of data that may be
subject to preservation, review, and eventual production.I Close behind in
relative vexatiousness are the facts that the subject data may be scattered among
hundreds or thousands of storage, management, and communications systems
and devices, and that the potential relevance of the data in these sources may not
be readily apparent, requiring some content analysis. Layered on top of these
technical challenges presented by EST is a pervasive fear among lawyers, based
on a cursory reading of the confusing case law, that any failure to completely
and accurately preserve, collect, review, and produce relevant nonprivileged ES1
in discovery-no matter how innocent or immaterial-will subject them to
severe case-altering and career-damaging spoliation sanctions.' This belief has
led lawyers to adopt a risk-averse "keep everything" approach to data
management, even in the absence of an identifiable business need, a statutory or
regulatory retention requirement, or a reasonably likely threat of litigation.4 But
the risk-aversion approach actually costs clients more and increases risk in the
long run.5 It needs to be replaced with a risk-management approach that
realistically assesses the costs of retention and preservation, weighing those costs
against a similarly realistic assessment of the value of the information to the
business and the risk of sanctions for its loss.
In Part II1 this Article explores the reasons behind the explosion of
potentially discoverable information, the pressure to "keep everything" in light
of perceived preservation obligations, and the enormous costs associated with
that approach. It then dissects the case law on spoliation, focusing first on the
common law as expressed in Fourth Circuit jurisprudence in Part III and then in
Part IV on the so-called safe harbor of Rule 37(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure6 and the cases in the Fourth Circuit that either apply it, decline to
apply it, or appear to ignore it in situations in which it arguably applies. Finally,

I. See, e.g., Dan HT.Willoughby, Jr. et al., Sanctions for E-Discovery Violations: By the
Numbers, 60 DUKE L.J. 789, 791 (2010) (listing the "high volume" of EST as its first defining
characteristic).
2.
See generally id. (listing "broad dispersal" as ESI's second defining characteristic).
3. See generally Burke T. Ward et al., Electronic Discovery: Rules for a Digital Age, 18
B.U. J. SC. & TECH. L. 150, 167 ("This uncertainty within both the legal community and courts has
only caused ain increase [in] costs and fears to litigants associated with electronic discovery.").
4.
See generally CAROL STAINBROOK ET AL., COHASETT AssoCs. INC.. ELECTRONICALLY
STORED INFORMATION (ESI)-LEGAL H4OLDS & DISPOSITION 5 (2012) (showing how organizations
have a "[h]old everything" attitude, retaining large amounts of information).
5.
WHERE

See generallyNICHOLAS M. PACE & LALRAZAKARAS, RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE,
THE MONEY GOES: UNDERSTAN7DING LITIGANT EXPENDITURES FOR PRODUCING

ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY 88 (2012) (discussing how expensive it is for a company to store data).
6. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(e).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol64/iss3/4
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drawing on the lessons of case law, in Part V this Article urges lawyers to
abandon the risk-aversion approach and adopt a variant of the business judgment
rule to make reasonable risk-management decisions regarding information
governance that minimize the EST held in the ordinary course of business,
thereby greatly reducing the costs associated with preservation.
11.

THE CAUSES AND COST OF OVERPRESERVATION

A.

Expansion ofPhysical DataStorage Capacity

The numbers are staggering. According to a 2011 article in Science
Magazine, by 2007 people were storing approximately 295 exabytes of digital
information, the equivalent of more than 60 CD-ROMs per person.' If one could
stack up those roughly 404 billion CD-ROMs, the stack would surpass the
distance to the moon by 25%.8
In corporations, government agencies, universities, and other organizations,
this digital information can be found on employee desktop computers; network
servers and peripheral devices such as printers and fax machines; mobile devices
such as smart phones, laptops, and tablets; countless removable media such as
USB drives, CD-ROMs, storage tapes, and external hard drives; archival or
disaster-recovery backup media; or the equipment of third-party data
communications, hosting, and storage companies such as Google and Amazon.
In 2005, an in-house attorney for an international energy firm painted a very
concrete picture of the problem for the Advisory Committee on the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure:
We operate in 200 countries in the world. We have 306 offices around
the world. 70 of them in the U.S. We generate 5.2 million e-mails a
day, about half of that in the U.S. We have 65.000 desktop computers
around the world and 30,000 laptop computers. These are for our
employees, about half of those in the U.S.
We have, in addition to the 65,000 desktops and 30,000 laptops, we
have between 15,000 and 20,000 Blackberries and PDAs around the
world. We have 7,000 servers worldwide, 4,000 of them in the U.S.
We have 1,000 to 2,000 networks worldwide, about half of those in the
U.S. We have 3,750 e-collaboration rooms. I assume that they're chat
room type things, for people to be working on documents
simultaneously. About 3,000 of those are in the U.S.

7.
See Martin Hilbert & Priscila L6pez, The World's Technological Capacity to Store,
Communicate, and Compute hIformation, 332 ScL 60, 62 (2011).
8.
See id.
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We have 3,000 databases; 2,000 of those in the U.S. Our total
storage of information that we now have is 800 terabytes, 500 terabytes
in the U.S.
And that was several years ago, before the rise of Twitter, social media, tablet
computers, cloud computing, and "bring your own device" policies in business. 10
Acting as both cause and effect in the explosion of digital information is the
decreasing cost of digital storage capacity, in accordance with the venerated
Moore's Law, which predicted as early as 1965 that the capacity of digital
information storage devices would double roughly every eighteen months.
More recently, dramatic increases in digital telecommunications speed and
bandwidth have made remote hostin of data feasible, revolutionizing the
economics of information technology.
With cloud-based computing services
now readily available, enterprises may now generate and store far more
information, as their own investment in technology infrastructure will no longer
limit them.13 Enterprises can simply rent additional digital capacity when
needed and distribute it via the Internet to employees, business partners, and
customers.
B. Changes in the Way TWTe
Create, Store, and Aanage Information
Perhaps more significant than the explosive growth in the capacity of
equipment, media, and services to store vast amounts of data are changes in the
way we generate, communicate, and manage data. There are two significant

9.

COMPLIANCE.

GOVERNANCE

&

OVERSIGHT COUNCIL.

BENCHMARK

SURVEY

ON

PREVAILING PRACTICES FOR LEGAL HOLDS IN GLOBAL 1000 COMPANIES 14 (2008) (citing Public
Hearingon ProposedAmendments to the FederalRules of Civil Procedure36-38 (2005) (statement
of Charles A. Beach, Coordinator of Corporate Litigation, Exxon Mobil Corporation), http://www.
uscourts.gov/uscourts/'RulesAndPolicies/rules/'e-discovery/DallasHearingl2805.pdt).
10. See Ana Cantu, [he Historv and Future of Cloud Computing, FORBES (Dec. 20, 2011,
1:20 PM), http://www.forbes.comisites/dell/2011/12/20/the-history-and-future-of-cloud-computing/
(discussing the rise of cloud computing): Anthony Curtis, BRIEF HISTORY SOCIAL MEDIA.
http://www.uncp.edu/home/acurtis/New Media/SocialMedia/SocialMedialHistory.html (last visited
Feb. 17, 2013) (discussing the evolution of social media from 1969 to 2012); Catherine Ho, A
Minefield of Legal Risks Come with "Bring Your Own Device" Policies, WASH. POST (Sept. 30.
2012), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-09-30/business'35497401 _Iprivacy-group-byodsensitive-data (discussing the prevalence of "bring your own device" policies).
11. Gordon E. Moore. Cramming llore Components onto IntegratedCircuits,ELECTRONICS.
Apr. 19, 1965, at 114, 115.
12. See Jon Brodkin, Bandwidth Explosion: As Internet Use Soars, Can Bottlenecks Be
Averted?, ARS TECHNICA (May 1, 2012 12:40 PM EDT), http://arstechnica.com/business/2012/05/
bandwidth-explosion-as-internet-use-soars-can-bottlenecks-be-averted/.
13. See Jared A. Harshbarger, Cloud Computing Providersand Data Security Law: Building
Trust with United States Companies, 16 J. TECH. L. & PO LY 229, 233 (2011).
14. See id. at 234.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol64/iss3/4
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contributors to data proliferation: routine replication and the replacement of
ephemeral communications with digital media.
Information constantly is being replicated in digital information systems.16
Every time information is sent from one person to another using a digital
information system, it is being replicated on the recipient's device, and perhaps
on several stations along the way. 1 Internally, information circulated within an
organization is being replicated in the process, as well as being regularly backed
up on archival or disaster-recovery media.18 This replication is a fundamental
difference between digital information systems and paper-based ones that
physically send information from one location to another and are limited in the
number of copies that could proliferate and be stored, even with the advent of
photocopiers and fax machines. 19
Communications that were truly ephemeral in the past are now routinely
captured and replicated in digital information systems. Analog telephone
conversations that would have disappeared as soon as the receiver was hung up
have largely been replaced by email, text messages, and social media posts,
which are stored and replicated with other digital business communications.
Handwritten notes have almost disappeared from the modern office environment,
replaced with electronic "sticky notes," voicemail, and instant messages. Paper
sales slips and receipts, once the only recorded evidence of routine transactions,
are now superfluous memos of transactions that have been recorded in vast sales,
inventory management, financial, and customer relations databases.
Against the backdrop of lower data storage costs and the prospect of cheaply
developing vast data collections utilizing cloud infrastructure, the concept of
"big data" has recently emerged to add to the pressure to hoard data.20 Access to
collections of data large and diverse enough to perform advanced analytics was
previously limited to large-scale scientific and medical research projects and law
enforcement. defense, and national security agencies.21 But because of the
transformation of business processes to digital models and the collection of vast

15.

See generally 3 JEFFREY S. KINSLER & JAY E. GRENIG, VIRGINIA PRACTICE SERIES:

CIVIL DISCOVERY § 21:25 (2012 2013 ed.) (detailing how holding replicant data becomes
redundant and expensive); Vawn Himmelsbach. Dealing with Data Proliferation, IT BUSINESS
(Sept. 19, 2006, 10:20 AM), Ittp://www.itbusiness.ca it/client/enhome/News.asp?id=40615&cid=13
(discussing the proliferation of email).
16. See KINSLER & GRENIG, supra note 15, at § 21:25.
17. See Kenneth J. Withers, Electronically Stored Inforination: The December 2006
Amnendnents to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 4 Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 171, 174
(2006).
18. See id
19. See id
20. See generally Jeff Bertolucci, Big Data T ip: Don't Save Everything, INFORMATIONWEEK
(Dec. 18, 2012, 9:06 AM), http://www.informationweek.com/big-data/news,'big-data-aiaIlytics/bigdata-tip-dont-save-everything/240144506 (discussing organizations' desires to collect data).
21. See generally Uri Friedman, Anthropology of an Idea: Big Data, FOREIGN POL'Y, Nov.
2012, at 30, 30 (walking through the history of "big data," showing how the concept originated in
government and scientific use).
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amounts of consumer data through web sites and social networking, it is now
possible for private industry to perform the same level of advanced analytics. 22
The effectiveness of targeted behavioral marketing based on analytics and the
much publicized success of the Obama campaign in the 2012 general election
have raised national consciousness of the potential-and perhaps dangers-of
"big data."n As a consequence, many businesses are tempted to collect and
store more data than they might otherwise collect or retain for primary business
purposes, anticipating possible secondary uses, either internally for analysis or to
sell as by-products of their digital business processes.24
C. Pressures to "Keep Everything"
The fundamental law regarding the duty of preservation has not changed
over the years, despite the astronomical increase in the volume of data
businesses, institutions, government agencies, and even private individuals
routinely generate, collect, manage, and store2 5 The law is relatively easy to
articulate:
[W]henever litigation is reasonably anticipated, threatened, or pending
against an organization, that organization has a duty to undertake
reasonable and good faith actions to preserve relevant and discoverable
information and tangible evidence. This duty arises at the point in time
when litigation is reasonably anticipated whether the organization is the
initiator or the target of litigation.
The duty to preserve requires a party to identify, locate, and
maintain information and tangible evidence that is relevant to specific
and identifiable litigation. It typically arises from the common law duty
to avoid spoliation of relevant evidence for use at trial and is not
explicitly defined in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 26

22. See generally id. ("As social networks proliferate, technology bloggers and professionals
breathe new life into the 'big data' concept."); Edd Dumbill, 47at Is Big Data?, STRATA (Jan. 11,
2012). http://strata.oreilly.com/2012/01/what-is-big-data.htnI (describing how large corporations as
well as small startups can now process big data).
23. See Sasha Issenberg, How President Obamna's Campaign Used Big Data to Rally
Individual Voters, MIT TECH. REv., Jan./Feb. 2013, at 38, 49.
24. See generally Bertolucci, supra note 20 ("[O]ften organizations make the mistake of
trying to collect every bit of data that's available to them, no matter how inconsequential.").
25. Compare Silvestri v. Gen. Motors Corp., 271 F.3d 583, 591 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing
Kronisch v. United States, 150 F.3d 112, 126 (2d Cir. 1998) (describing the duty to preserve), iith
Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc., 269 F.R.D. 497. 521 (D. Md. 2010) (applying the same
standard nearly ten years later).
26. The Sedona Conference, Comnentary on Legal Holds: Tie Trigger & the Process, II
SEDONA CONF. J. 265, 267 (2010).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol64/iss3/4
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Because preservation is a common law duty, its contours are subject to a
wide range of interpretation by the courts.27 Decisions regarding the duty to
preserve are invariably post-hoc judgments on the adequacy of a party's
preservation efforts, analyzed in the context of an alleged failure to preserve and
resulting motion to either compel production or issue sanctions. 28 Successful
preservation efforts are never the subject of judicial decisions, and it is next to
impossible to obtain an advisory opinion from a court to guide preservation
activities.29
Various defense-oriented law firms and legal organizations have noted an
alarming increase in the number of reported spoliation sanctions decisions over
the past few years, concurrent with the rise of electronic discovery.30 On the
other hand, legal commentators sympathetic to requesting parties in litigation
counter that the numbers are overblown and misleading and that in recent
months the number of reported spoliation sanction decisions has actually
declined.
While the commentators debate the significance of the statistics, it is
undisputed that risk-averse attorneys are advising their business and institutional
clients to formalize their preservation efforts, expand their scope, and keep
material longer than ever before. As observed by Judge Lee Rosenthal, former
Chair of the Judicial Conference's Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure, "[t]he frequency of spoliation allegations may lead to decisions about
preservation based more on fear of potential future sanctions than on reasonable
need for information."
Organizations that participate in interstate commerce, and may be subject to
the jurisdiction of courts in different states and federal circuits, have to deal with
conflicting guidance on preservation and spoliation.
Again, risk-aversion
dictates that attorneys advise their clients to follow the strictest guidelines
regarding preservation from any court in which they could reasonably face
litigation.

27. See Victor Stanley, Inc., 269 F.R.D. at 519.
28. See id. at 514.
29. See, e.g., Texas v. City of Frisco, No. 4:07cy 3 83, 2008 WL 828055, at *3, *4 (E.D. Tex.
Mar. 27. 2008) (dismissing request for declarative judgment and protective order defining
preservation obligations in pending litigation for lack of "case or controversy" conferring
jurisdiction).
30. See, e.g., Willoughby et al., supra note 1. at 791 ("Producing parties have struggled to
comply with ever-expanding and increasingly complex responsibilities as EST has played a
predominant role in pretrial discovery.").
31. See Ariana J. ladler & Henry J. Kelston. Fears of Discovery Burden Are Exaggerated,
NAT'L L.J.. Dec. 19. 2011. at 18. 18.
32. See generily STAINBROOK ET AL., supra note 4, at 5 (showing how organizations have a
"[h]old everything" attitude, retaining large amounts of information).
33. Rimkus Consulting Grp., Inc. v. Canmmarata, 688 F. Supp. 2d 598. 607 (S.D. Tex. 2010).
34.

See generally GARY L. WICKERT, SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE IN ALL 50 STATES (2012).

http://ww.mwl-law.com/CM/Resources/Spoliation-Laws-Iin-All-50-States.pdf
court spoliation cases).
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Organizations that routinely are involved in multiple legal actions face the
additional pressure of rolling litigation holds, in which collections of documents
and EST are preserved for litigation, overlapping with subsequent litigation and
with litigation to come.
Since the scope of the duty of preservation includes
"reasonably anticipated" litigation as well as filed actions, caches of data may be
under one or more litigation holds interminably.
A recent survey of professional records and information managers attending
a conference in Chicago attempted to define the "overpreservation" problem.
More than 200 attendees from large companies, institutions, and government
agencies participated. The survey report indicated that 25% of all participating
organizations had 100 or more active litigation holds; over half, 53%, of large
organizations (over 25,000 employees) had 100 or more active litigation holds,
and over 25% of those large organizations reported more than 300 active
litigation holds.39 Sixty-five percent of respondents from smaller organizations
and 100% of respondents from larger organizations described the scope of their
litigation holds as "very broad," leading the report's authors to conclude that
"[i]mpacted organizations tend to transition to a 'Hold everything' frame of
mind." 40 Twenty to 32% of respondents reported that they routinely "preserve
everything" when it comes to email and other ESI, rather than attempt to
preserve narrowly and selectively.41
Eighty-eight percent of respondents reported that they have litigation holds
that include material more than ten years old.42 Half reported that they have
litigation holds involving material more than twenty years old, and 13% have
material more than fifty years old under litigation hold.
Although most organizations have well-developed retention and disposition
schedules for their paper records and electronic data, the survey reports that
approximately 25% are not routinely destroying outdated records and ESI, and
50% have an approval process that adds a layer of decisionmaking on top of the
disposition schedule, rendering it largely ineffective because decisionmakers are
averse to disposing of records and ESI, even when no longer needed for business
purposes, subject to legal retention requirements, or subject to a formal litigation

35. See, e.g., STAINBROOK ET AL., supra note 4, at 5 (showing how in one survey, 100% of
large organizations were involved in a litigation hold "very broad in nature affecting a large amount
of information").
36. See id.
37. See id. at 3.
38. See id.; see also About MER: Attendees by Organization, NAT'L CONF. ON MANAGING
ELECTRONIC REcs.. http://www.merconference.com/about/pastMER/attendeesorganization.php
(last visited Mar. 3. 2013) (providing a general list of the companies and organizations that attend
the conference).
39. Id. at 4.
40. Id. at 5.
41. Id. at 6.
42. Id. at 8.
43. Id.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol64/iss3/4
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hold. 44 "Fear" was listed as a primary cause for overpreservation, with such
comments from the survey respondents as:
"Not sure if it is subject to a Hold."
"Information might be needed for [regulatory] audits."
"Legal makes it too complicated with all the caveats, so employees feel
safer keeping it all."
"Legal moratoriums, too focused on the next project/fire to address
closing out content, MAY be needed ....
D. Costs Associated with the "Keep Everything" Approach
The "keep everything" approach comes with a price, even factoring in the
relatively low cost of physical storage.46 According to a recent study published
by the RAND Institute for Civil Justice:
The purchase price of individual servers needed to store preserved data
may not be impressive in and of itself, it was said, but, when associated
expenses for network connections, maintenance, redundancy,
development, security, and backup are factored in, all resources
associated with a single terabyte of preserved data were said to cost in
excess of $100,000. One company reported that one-third of its IT
department's email resources were now dedicated to preserved
information.)4
While the cost of data storage is not insignificant, the cost of handling this data is
significantly higher. According to the same RAND study, the median cost for
data collection in response to discovery is $940 per gigabyte for collection,
$2,931 per gigabyte for processing, and $13,636 per gigabyte for review.
Extrapolating from the RAND figures, that one-third of a terabyte of email being
preserved costs $313,853 to collect and will cost $976,902.20 to process and
$4,544,878.80 to review for production.49

44.
45.
46.
storage).
47.
48.
49.

See id. at 12-13.
Id. at 15.
See generally Moore, supra note II,

at 115 (explaining the low cost of electronic

See PACE & ZAKARAS, supra note 5. at 88.
Id. at 28.
Id.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
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A survey of Global 1000 companies with revenue over $5 billion was
conducted between October 2007 and March 2008.50 It attempted to quantify the
costs associated with litigation holds. The respondents reported an average of
980 new legal matters each year, of which 80% required formal litigation
holds. 52 The survey broke down the administration of legal holds into a series of
discrete tasks, such as issuing the hold notice, following up with individual
custodians, and collecting files. An organization with 200 legal holds per year,
involving an average of seventy-five custodians each, will need to execute
approximately 167,000 discrete tasks occupying approximately 15,000 staff
hours5 4
For all their expense, preservation activities seldom return value to the
parties. 55 In a surprising admission, a defense-oriented legal organization
acknowledged that little of what is preserved is ever called for in litigation,
implying that either little analysis is going into preservation decisionmaking, or
it is driven more by fear than by need:
[A] shockingly small percentage of the information preserved is actually
utilized by the parties in support of their claims or defenses. Indeed,
much of what is preserved is never even collected, let alone produced.
This disparity will only widen as the explosion of technology continues
and greater and greater volumes of ESI are created and subsequently
subjected to preservation obligations resulting from litigation.
One would think a higher value would be placed on activities aimed at reducing
the volume of data subject to preservation in the first place, rather than on
conducting expensive, complex, and ultimately valueless preservation,
collection, and review projects.
III. CASE LAW ON PRESERVATION AND SPOLIATION
A.

Spoliation and the 4dverse Inference Jwy Instruction

Fear of sanctions drives the pressure for overpreservation, and the sanction
for the loss of discoverable information that parties to litigation fear most is the
adverse inference jury instruction, a type of spoliation sanction.

50.

See COMPLIANCE, GOVERNANCE & OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, supra note 9, at 6-7.

51. See id. at 6.
52. Id. at 9.
53. Id. at 16 20.
54. Id. at 22.
55.

See LAWYERS FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, PRESERVATION-MOVING TIE PARADIGM To RULE

TEXT 14 (2011), http://wwv.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/DallasMiniConf Comments/
Law yers%20foro0 2OCivil% 0"OJustice.pdf.
56. Id.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol64/iss3/4
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The doctrine of spoliation arose as a judge-made rule to address the impact
of missing evidence.7 Spoliation is best understood as a rule of evidence58
because its primary purpose is to shift the burden of demonstrating the value of a
particular piece of evidence from the proponent to the party deemed responsible
for the loss of the evidence.59 The oft-cited origin of the doctrine of spoliation is
the eighteenth century King's Bench decision in Armory v Delamirie,60 in which
a chimneysweep's assistant found a jewel and brought it to a goldsmith for
appraisal.
The goldsmith's apprentice took the jewel, declared it to be of no
value, and offered only the value of the setting.62 The chimneysweep's boy
refused the offer and requested return of the jewel itself, but the goldsmith's
apprentice would not return it.63 The chimneysweep's apprentice sued the
goldsmith in trover, demanding return of the jewel or its value as damages.64
Because the jewel itself was lost, the value could not be determined directly .65
The court resorted to circumstantial evidence, essentially invoking the Latin
maxim omnia praesumunturcontraspoliatorem66:
As to the value of the jewel several of the trade were examined to
prove what a jewel of the finest water that would fit the socket would be
worth; and the Chief Justice directed the jury, that unless the defendant
did produce the jewel, and shew it not to be of the finest water, they
should presume the strongest against him, and make the value of the
67
best jewels the measure of their damages: which they accordingly did.
The burden of demonstrating the value of the missing jewel was shifted from
the plaintiff to the defendant through the mechanism of a rebuttable presumption,
based on the culpable conduct of the goldsmith's apprentice and, by extension,
the goldsmith himself. While the presumption was technically rebuttable, as a
practical matter it was highly unlikely that the defendant would find the jewel to
present to the jury for valuation.

57. See id at 517 n.12 (citing Armory v. Delamirie, (1722) 93 Eng. Rep. 664. 664 (K.B.); 1
Strange 506).
58. See Vodusek v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 71 F.2d 148, 155 (4th Cir. 1995) ("[T]he
spoliation of evidence rule ... is not an affirmative defense, but a rule of evidence, to be
administered at the discretion of the trial court.").
59. See Pension Comm. of the Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of Am. Sec., LLC.
685 F. Supp. 2d 456, 468-69 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). abrogatedby Chin v. Port Auth., 685 F.3d 135 (2d
Cir. 2012).
60. (1722) 93 Eng. Rep. 664 (K.B.); 1 Strange 506.
61. See id
62. See id
63. See id
64. See id
65. See id
66. "All presumptions are against [the wrongdoer]." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1857 (9th
ed. 2009).
67. 93 Eng. Rep. at 664 (K.B.); 1 Strange at 506.
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Over the years, this classic remedy for the loss of evidence-the adverse
inference jury instruction-has become synonymous with spoliation itself.68 In
reality, courts have at their disposal a wide range of remedies and sanctions for
the loss of discoverable information, from the simple expedient of ordering
alternative discovery to the dramatic sanction of default judgment or dismissal.6
In addition, the adverse inference jury instruction comes in many flavors.70 As
Judge Shira Scheindlin noted in Pension Committee of the University of
Montreal Pension Plan v. Bane of,merica Securities, LLC :
Like many other sanctions, an adverse inference instruction can take
many forms, again ranging in degrees of harshness. The harshness of
the instruction should be determined based on the nature of the
spoliating party's conduct-the more egregious the conduct, the more
harsh the instruction.
In its most harsh form, when a spoliating party has acted willfully or
in bad faith, a jury can be instructed that certain facts are deemed
admitted and must be accepted as true. At the next level, when a
spoliating party has acted willfully or recklessly, a court may impose a
mandatory presumption. Even a mandatory presumption, however, is
considered to be rebuttable.
The least harsh instruction permits (but does not require) a jury to
presume that the lost evidence is both relevant and favorable to the
innocent party. If it makes this presumption, the spoliating party's
rebuttal evidence must then be considered by the jury, which must then
decide whether to draw an adverse inference against the spoliating party.
This sanction still benefits the innocent party in that it allows the jury to
consider both the misconduct of the spoliating party as well as proof of
prejudice to the innocent party. Such a charge should be termed a
"spoliation charge" to distinguish it from a charge where the a [sic] jury
is directed to presume, albeit still subject to rebuttal, that the missing
evidence would have been favorable to the innocent party, and from a
charge where the j ury is directed to deem certain facts admitted.

68. See, e.g., Pension Comm. of Univ. of the Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of Am. Sec.,
LLC, 685 F. Supp. 2d 456, 496 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (giving ain adverse inference jury instruction and
telling the jury it is for spoliation of evidence), abrogated by Chin v. Port Auth., 685 F.3d 135 (2d
Cir. 2012).
69. Compare United States v. Universal Health Servs.. Inc.. No. 1:07cy000054, 2011 WL
3426046, at *6 (W.D. Va. Aug. 5, 2011) (ordering forensic imaging to recover lost data), ith
Silvestri v. Gen. Motors Corp., 271 F.3d 583, 595 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding that the trial court's
order dismissing the case for failure to preserve key evidence was not an abuse of discretion).
70. See e.g., Pension Comm.. 685 F. Supp. 2d at 470-71 (describing the different adverse
inference instructions with varying levels of harshness).
71. 685 F. Supp. 2d 456.
72. Id. at 470-71 (footnotes omitted).
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Furthermore, the adverse inference jury instruction is not issued
automatically upon a determination that discoverable information has been lost.7
As an evidentiary ruling, it must be based on a set of findings.74 While the exact
formulation of the elements necessary to justify an adverse inference jury
instruction varies from circuit to circuit, state to state. and even from court to
court, ' the essential elements are the same.76 In the Fourth Circuit, to support a
sanction for the loss of discoverable evidence, the court must find:
(1) [T]he party having control over the evidence had an obligation to
preserve it when it was destroyed or altered; (2) the destruction or loss
was accompanied by a "culpable state of mind;" and (3) the evidence
that was destroyed or altered was "relevant" to the claims or defenses of
the party that sought the discovery of the spoliated evidence, to the
extent that a reasonable factfinder could conclude that the lost evidence
would have supported the claims or defenses of the party that sought
it.

While courts will generally consider sanctions on the grounds of these three
elements, courts "take into account the blameworthiness of the offending party
and the prejudice suffered by the opposing party"78 to determine the severity of
the sanction to be imposed, thus adding a fourth element of prejudice in
considering the adverse inference jury instruction or any other particular
sanction.
B.

The Dluty to Preserve and Its Scope
1. No Duty ofPreservationin the Abstract

There is no abstract common law duty to preserve information or tangible
objects for discovery. 79 On the contrary, the United States Supreme Court

73. See generally Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc., 269 F.R.D. 497, 535 (D. Md.
2010) ("In its discretion, the court may order ain adverse inference instruction . .).
74. See generally id. at 527 (citing Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 229 F.R.D. 422. 440
(S.D.N.Y. 2004)) (explaining how the "tedious and difficult fact finding" regarding the duty to
preserve ESI greatly burdens "a court's limited resources").
75. See id. at 516 (stating variations among federal circuits exist regarding the standards for
the imposition of spoliation sanctions and that there is a "lack of a federal standard").

76. See id. at 521 & n.31.
77. Goodman v. Praxair Servs., Inc.. 632 F. Supp. 2d 494, 509 (D. Md. 2009) (citing
Thompson v. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 219 F.R.D. 93, 101 (D. Md. 2003)).
78. Broccoli v. Echostar Commc'ns Corp., 229 F.R.D. 506, 510 (D. Md. 2005).
79. See Victor Stanley, Inc., 269 F.R.D. at 521 (explaining that the common law duty to
preserve evidence does not begin until "the moment ... litigation is reasonably anticipated").
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recognizes that, as a general proposition, businesses and individuals have a right
to dispose of their documents and data as they see fit.80
"Document retention policies," which are created in part to keep
certain information from getting into the hands of others, including the
Government, are common in business. It is, of course, not wrongful for
a manager to instruct his employees to comply with a valid document
retention policy under ordinary circumstances.81
In Mficron Technology, Inc. v. Rainbus Inc., 82 the Federal Circuit Court of
Appeals considered the destruction of documents and ESI pursuant to a
document retention policy the defendant initiated shortly before launching a
series of patent infringement actions.83 The court stated:
First, it is certainly true that most document retention policies are
adopted with benign business purposes, reflecting the fact that
"litigation is an ever-present possibility in American life." In addition,
there is the innocent purpose of simply limiting the volume of a party's
files and retaining only that which is of continuing value. One might
call it the "good housekeeping" purpose. Thus, where a party has a
long-standing policy of destruction of documents on a regular schedule,
with that policy motivated by general business needs, which may
include a general concern for the possibility of litigation, destruction
that occurs in line with the policy is relatively unlikely to be seen as
spoliation.84
2.

The Trigger of the Duty ofPreservation

The extraordinary circumstances under which the dicta from the Supreme
Court does not apply, and the "relatively unlikely" circumstances to which the
Federal Circuit alludes, are situations in which the information is subject to a
specific statute or regulation requiring retention, or when litigation is
"reasonably anticipated."85 The "reasonable anticipation" standard does not
encompass the general anxiety that businesses and individuals may feel living in
86c
a litigious society but must be grounded in fact. "A reasonable anticipation of

80. See generally Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake IV), 220 F.R.D. 212, 216
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (explaining that the court can only a sanction a party "for destroying evidence if it
had a duty to preserve it").
81. Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States. 544 U.S. 696, 704 (2005) (citation omitted).
82. 645 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
83. See id. at 1315, 1316, 1317-18.
84. Id. at 1322 (citation omitted) (quoting Nat'1 Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Murray Sheet Metal
Co., 967 F.2d 980, 984 (4th Cir. 1992)).
85. See The Sedona Conference, supra note 26, at 268, 271.
86. See id.
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litigation arises when an organization is on notice of a credible probability that it
will become involved in litigation, seriously contemplates initiating litigation, or
when it takes specific actions to commence litigation."7
The duty of preservation can arise well before a party files suit. "The duty
to preserve material evidence arises not only during litigation but also extends to
that period before the litigation when a party reasonably should know that the
evidence may be relevant to anticipated litigation." 8
3.

The Scope of the Duty ofPreservation:Post-Hoc Analysis

The scope of the duty to preserve does not extend to all information or
tangible objects that may be within the possession, custody, or control of the
party, but only to that which is likely to be subject to discovery. 90 Rather, "[t]he
duty to preserve encompasses any documents or tangible items authored or made
by individuals likely to have discoverable information that the disclosing party
may use to support its claims or defenses." 91
Led by Judge Lee Rosenthal, former chair of the Civil Rules Advisory
Committee and the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of
the Judicial Conference of the United States,92 a few courts and legal
commentators in recent years have injected a reasonableness or proportionality
aspect into the post-hoc analysis of the scope of the duty of preservation.
According to Judge Rosenthal, "[w]hether preservation or discovery conduct is
acceptable in a case depends on what is reasonable, and that in turn depends on
whether what was done-or not done-was proportional to that case and
consistent with clearly established applicable standards."9 Judge Paul Grimm of
the District of Maryland wrote that "the scope of preservation should somehow
be proportional to the amount in controversy and the costs and burdens of
preservation."95 Perhaps most importantly, the concept of reasonableness in the
post-hoc analysis of preservation activities has found its way into the current

87. Id. at 269.
88. See, e.g., ion. Paul W. Grimm et al., Proportionalityin the Post-Hoc Analysis of PreLitigation Preservation Decisions, 37 U. BALT. L. REV. 381, 385 (2008) ("[T]he duty to preserve
often arises before litigation is commenced .... ").
89. Silvestri v. Gen. Motors Corp., 271 F.3d 583, 591 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing Kronisch v.
United States, 150 F.3d 112, 126 (2d Cir. 1998)).
90. See Broccoli v. Echostar Commc'ns Corp., 229 F.R.D. 506. 510 (D. Md. 2005) (citing
Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. 212, 217-18 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)).
91. Id. (citing Zubiake IV, 220 F.R.D. at 217-18).
92. See Biography: Lee H. Rosenthal, Am. L. INST., http://www.ali.org/index.cfm'fuse
action=about.bio&bio id=54 (last visited Feb. 24, 2013).
93. See Rimkus Consulting Grp., Inc. v. Cammarata, 688 F. Supp. 2d 598. 607. 613 (S.D.
Tex. 2010).
94. Id. at 613.
95. Grimm et al., supra note 88, at 405.
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round of federal rulemaking.96 The Civil Rules Advisory Committee approved a
proposed new Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(e), intended to completely
replace the current Rule 37(e), which was approved by the Advisory Committee
on November 2, 2012, and submitted to the Standing Committee on Rules of
Practice and Procedure for consideration at its meeting on January 3-4, 2013.97
It contains the following language:
Rule 37. Failure to Make Disclosures or to Cooperate in Discovery;
Sanctions

(e) Failure to Preserve Discoverable Information. If a party failed
to preserve discoverable information that reasonably should have been
preserved in the anticipation or conduct of litigation,
(1) The court may permit additional discovery, order the party
to undertake curative measures, or require the party to pay the
reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the
failure.
(3) In determining whether a party failed to preserve
discoverable information that reasonabi
should have been
preserved, and whether the failure was willful or in bad faith, the
court should consider all relevant factors, including:
(B) the reasonableness of the party's efforts to preserve the
information[.]98

The proposed Committee Note to accompany the new rule states, "[t]he amended
rule is designed to ensure that potential litigants who make reasonable efforts to
satisfy their preservation responsibilities may do so with confidence that they
will not be subjected to serious sanctions should information be lost despite
those efforts."99
According to attendees of the January 2013 Standing Committee meeting,
the proposed Rule 37(e) was the subject of spirited debate, ultimately resulting in

96. See generally Advisory Comm. on Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure, Judicial Conference of
the U.S., Draft Minutes of the November 2, 2012 Meeting of the .4dvisory Committee on Civil Rules,
in COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 251, 255 (2013), http://www.uscourts.gov/
uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Agendao2OBooks/Standing/ST2013-O1.pdf (explaining how factors
in the amended Rule 37(e) emphasize "reasonableness and proportionality").
97. See id. at 253-54; Advisory Comm. on Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure, Judicial
Conference of the U.S., Report of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules (Dec. 5, 2012), in
COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 96, at 91, 93.
98. Advisory Comm. on Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure, Judicial Conference of the U.S..
supra note 97, at 103-04.
99. Id. at 131.
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the Standing Committee approving it for publication in August 2013, but with
suggested modifications to be submitted at the June 2013 Standing Committee
meeting. 100 The inclusion of the reasonableness standard, however, was not
considered controversial and will likely survive possible revision. 10o
4.

The Scope of the Duty ofPreservation:Ex- 4nte 4nalysis

If reasonableness is becoming the guiding principle for judges in analyzing
preservation decisions after the fact, may parties rely on reasonableness in
making proactive decisions about the scope of discovery?
The Sedona
Conference, in its Commentary on Legal Holds, posits that "[flactors that may be
considered in determining the scope of information that should be preserved
include the nature of the issues raised in the matter, the accessibility of the
information, the probative value of the information, and the relative burdens and
costs of the preservation effort." 12 Similarly, The Sedona Conference states as
its Proportionality Principle 1 that "[t]he burdens and costs of preservation of
potentially relevant information should be weighed against the potential value
and uniqueness of the information when determining the appropriate scope of
preservation."o10
But some courts have questioned the efficacy of reasonableness as a reliable
standard for making preservation scope and activity decisions:
Although some cases have suggested that the definition of what
must be preserved should be guided by principles of "reasonableness
and proportionality," this standard may prove too amorphous to provide
much comfort to a party deciding what files it may delete or backup
tapes it may recycle. Until a more precise definition is created by rule, a
party is well-advised to "retain all relevant documents (but not multiple
identical copies) in existence at the time the duty to preserve attaches."
In this respect, "relevance" means relevance for purposes of discovery,
which is "an extremely broad concept." 104
Additionally:

100. See id. at 93.
101. See Advisory Comm. on Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure, Judicial Conference of the U.S.,
supra note 96, at 255-58.
102. The Sedona Conference, supra note 26, at 280.
103. The Sedona Conference, Commentaty on Proportionality in Electronic Discovery, II
SEDONA CONE J. 289, 296 (2010).
104. Orbit One Commc'ns, Inc. v. Numerex Corp., 271 F.R.D. 429, 436-37 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)
(footnotes omitted) (citations omitted) (quoting Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc., 269
F.R.D. 497, 523 (D. Md. 2010); Condit v. Dunne, 225 F.R.D. 100, 105 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); Zubulake
1. 220 F.R.D. 212, 218 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)).
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Reasonableness and proportionality are surely good guiding
principles for a court that is considering imposing a preservation order
or evaluating the sufficiency of a party's efforts at preservation after the
fact. Because these concepts are highly elastic, however, they cannot be
assumed to create a safe harbor for a party that is obligated to preserve
evidence but is not operating under a court-imposed preservation order.
Proportionality is particularly tricky in the context of preservation. It
seems unlikely, for example, that a court would excuse the destruction
of evidence merely because the monetary value of anticipated litigation
was low.1
C. Culpable State ofAfind
If a duty to preserve discoverable evidence has been established, the next
element in the spoliation analysis for the court is whether the party that lost the
evidence did so with a culpable state of mind. o0 However, the degree of
culpability necessary for a court to issue an adverse inference jury instruction is
a matter of considerable national debate. 0 In the Second Circuit, the leading
opinion on culpability is Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Financial
Corp., os in which the court held that negligence is a sufficiently culpable state
of mind to warrant an adverse inference jury instruction, reasoning that "[t]he
sanction of an adverse inference may be appropriate in some cases involving the
negligent destruction of evidence because each party should bear the risk of its
own negligence." io0 Residential Funding and other Second Circuit precedents
were relied upon more recently in Pension Committee, in which the court found
several parties grossly negligent in their preservation efforts. 110 This provided
sufficient basis for an adverse inference jury instruction, although the court did
not find that any of the parties acted in bad faith.'
The Second Circuit recently clarified Residential Funding by stating that "a
finding of gross negligence merely permits, rather than requires, a district court
to give an adverse inference instruction."12 It should also be noted that the
Second Circuit in Residential Funding remanded the case to the trial court for
further consideration and did not itself find that the conduct in the case

105. Id. at n.10; see also Pippins v. KPMG LLP, No. 11 Civ. 0377(CM)(JLC), 2011 WL
4701849, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 2011) (stating that courts have cautioned against the use of the
proportionality test for preserv ation).
106. See IVictor Stanley, Inc.. 269 F.R.D. at 529.
107. See id.
108. 306 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 2002).
109. Id. at 108.
110. Pension Conun. of the Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of Am. Sec.. LLC. 685 F.
Supp. 2d 456, 479 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), abrogatedbyChin v. Port Auth., 685 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2012).
111. See id. at 496-97.
112. Chin. 685 F.3d at 162.
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warranted the adverse inference jury instruction.113 Further, it characterized the
accused party's conduct as something more than negligence, adopting the trial
court's euphonious phrase "somewhat purposeful sluggishness" to describe the
accused party's efforts to meet discovery obligations, and indicating that this
alone would be a sufficient state of mind to support the adverse inference.114
Courts in other circuits have declined to follow the Second Circuit-or at
least declined to follow a simplistic interpretation of Residential Funding----on
the question of culpability.115 Most notably. just a few weeks after the court
published the Pension Committee decision, Judge Lee Rosenthal published a
decision on spoliation of EST and used the opportunity to contrast the Second
Circuit's approach with that of the Fifth Circuit, which requires the court to find
bad faith before an adverse inference instruction can go to the jury.116 In Rimkus
Consulting Group, Inc. v. Cammarata,1 an action to enforce a noncompetition
agreement, the court found that the defendants communicated their plans to start
a competing business and transferred files from their former employer through
secret web-based email accounts.
In addition, one defendant donated his
computer to charity after litigation commenced,
and the defendants agreed to
delete the emails of their new business after two weeks, 120 even though litigation
was pending.
These and other factual findings led the court to
the conclusion that there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to
find that the defendants intentionally and in bad faith deleted emails
relevant to setting up and operating U.S. Forensic, to obtaining
information from Rimkus and using it for U.S. Forensic, and to
soliciting Rimkus clients, to prevent the use of these emails in litigation
in Louisiana or Texas. 122
Characterizing the adverse inference jury instruction as a "severe" sanction,
the court held that a finding of bad faith-and not just intentional action-was
necessary to support such a sanction:
Destruction or deletion of information subject to a preservation
obligation is not sufficient for sanctions. Bad faith is required. A severe

113. See ResidentialFunding Cop., 306 F.3d at 113.
114. See id. at 110 (citation omitted).
115. Rimkus Consulting Grp., Inc. v. Cammarata, 688 F. Supp. 2d 598, 615 (S.D. Tex. 2010)
(citing Pension Comm., 685 F. Supp. 2d at 478; ResidentialFunding Coip., 306 F.3d at 108).
116. See id. (citing Pension Comm., 685 F. Supp. 2d at 478: Residential Funding Corp., 306
F.3d at 108).
117. 688 F. Supp. 2d 598.
118. See id. at 626.
119. See id at 630 (citation omitted).
120. See id at 633.
121. Id. (citation omitted).
122. Id. at 644.
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sanction such as a default j udgment or an adverse inference instruction
requires bad faith and prejudice. ("[A] jury may draw an adverse
inference 'that party who intentionally destroys important evidence in
bad faith did so because the contents of those documents were
unfavorable to that party."')123
In the Fourth Circuit, the leading case defining the "culpable state of mind"
is Vodusek v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 1 a personal injury action the widow of a
pleasure boat owner killed in an explosion and fire on board brought against the
manufacturer and seller of the boat.'
The spoliation issue did not involve
documents or data; rather, it involved physical evidence.126 In examining the
boat to discover the cause of the explosion and fire the plaintiff "employed
destructive methods which rendered many portions of the boat useless for
examination by the defendants and their experts."m The trial court issued an
adverse inference jury instruction, and the plaintiff appealed.128 According to the
court:
Vodusek's principal argument is that the defendants must show that
she acted in bad faith before the jury can be permitted to draw adverse
inferences as to what the boat would have revealed had it not been
damaged. She maintains, "There was not a shred of evidence that [she]
or her agents, acted willfully, or in bad faith, when Mr. Halsey
examined the boat on December 28, 1989." She also argues that the
district court erred in not including the requirement of bad faith as part
of its jury instructions. We reject the argument that bad faith is an
essential element of the spoliation rule.
As a general proposition, the trial court has broad discretion to
permit a jury to draw adverse inferences from a party's failure to present
evidence, the loss of evidence, or the destruction of evidence. While a
finding of bad faith suffices to permit such an inference, it is not always
necessary. 129
The circuits may be divided by a common language of culpability. While
such terms as negligence, gross negligence, and recklessness are difficult enough
to define, the term "willful" seems to create the most problem in the spoliation

123. Id at 642-43 (citations omitted) (quoting Whitt v. Stephens Cnty., 529 F.3d 278, 284
(5th Cir. 2008)).
124. 71 F.3d 148 (4th Cir. 1995).
125. See id. at 151.
126. See id at 155.
127. Id
128. See id.
129. Id. at 156.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol64/iss3/4

20

Withers: Risk Aversion, Risk Management, and the "Overpreservation" Prolbe
2013]

OVERPRESERVATION IN ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY

557

cases.130 In Pension Committee, Judge Scheindlin borrowed from tort law to
define "willful" as requiring "that the actor has intentionally done an act of an
unreasonable character in disregard of a known or obvious risk that was so great
as to make it highly probable that harm would follow, and which thus is usually
accompanied by a conscious indifference to the consequences."131 On the other
hand, the Fourth Circuit's holding in Buckley v. MIukasev,12 remanding to the
trial court for further consideration of culpability in spoliation, appears to place
"willful" along a continuum, greater than negligence but less than bad
The effect is to equate "willful" with "intentional" or "deliberate," 1 and in the
case under consideration, with the destruction of ESI pursuant to "routine
internal procedures."1
D. Relevance
The third element in the spoliation analysis is the relevance of the lost
evidence.136 For the purposes of spoliation, the term "relevant" has a different
and narrower meaning than it has tinder Federal Rule of Evidence 401 1 or
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1).
In the Fourth Circuit, as an element
in the spoliation analysis, lost or destroyed evidence is relevant if "a reasonable
factfinder could conclude that the lost evidence would have supported the claims
or defenses of the part) that sought it."139
While relevance is a threshold consideration in the spoliation analysisthere is no duty to preserve information that is not relevant to the litigation-the
fact that the lost information would have been relevant does not end the

130. See, e.g., Buckley v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 306, 323 (4th Cir. 2008) (providing "willful" as
an example of a type of conduct, along with "intentional" and "deliberate"); Pension Comm. of the
Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of Am. Sec.. LLC. 685 F. Supp. 2d 456, 463-64 (S.D.N.Y.
2010) (quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 31, at 169,
§ 34, at 211-12, 213 (5th ed. 1984)) (seeking to define the term "willful"), abrogated by Chin v.
Port Auth., 685 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2012).
131. Pension Comm.. 685 F. Supp. 2d at 464 (quoting KEETON ET AL . supra note 130, § 34, at
213).
132. 538 F.3d 306.
133. See id. at 323.
134. See id.
135. Id. at 322.
136. Victor Stanley. Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc., 269 F.R.D. 497, 531 (D. Md. 2010).
137. FED. R. EviID. 401 ("Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make a fact more or
less probable than it would be without the evidence .7... ).
138. FED. R. Cly. P. 26(b)(1) ("Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged
matter than is relevant to any party's claim or defense .... ").
139. Thompson v. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 219 F.R.D. 93, 101 (D. Md. 2003)
(citing Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir. 2002);
Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. 212, 220 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)).
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inquiry. 140 If relevant information has been destroyed through culpable conduct
after a duty of preservation attached, one has established a prima facie spoliation
claim. 141The relationship of the relevant information, the ability of the parties to
present their substantive claims or defenses, and the ability of the court to fairly
adjudicate those claims and defenses, however, determines the remedy or
sanction.' 1
E. Prejudice
Relevance leads us to the fourth factor in the spoliation analysis:
prejudice. 14 To distinguish prejudice from relevance, one needs to understand
that the duty of preservation is not a conventional tort concept. 144 The duty to
refrain from destroying evidence is not a duty owed to the opposing party in
litigation, and the measure of prejudice is not the degree to which the failure to
preserve discoverable evidence hindered the discovery process.145 The duty is
owed to the court, and the measure of prej udice is the degree to which the failure
to preserve discoverable evidence hinders the court's ability to adjudicate the
case, by preventing the requesting party from effectively presenting its claims or
defenses:
That the duty is owed to the court, and not to the party's adversary
is a subtle, but consequential, distinction. A proper appreciation of the
distinction informs the Court's decision regarding appropriate spoliation
sanctions. Where intentionally egregious conduct leads to spoliation of
evidence but causes no prejudice because the evidence destroyed was
not relevant, or was merely cumulative to readily available evidence, or
because the same evidence could be obtained from other sources, then
the integrity of the judicial system has been injured far less than if
simple negligence results in the total loss of evidence essential for an
adversary to prosecute or defend against a claim. In the former instance.
the appropriateness of a case-dispositive sanction is questionable despite
the magnitude of the culpability, because the harm to the truth-finding
process is slight, and lesser sanctions such as monetary ones will suffice.
In contrast, a sympathetic though negligent party whose want of

140. IVictor Stanley, Inc., 269 F.R.D. at 531 (citing Pension Com. of the Univ. of Montreal
Pension Plan v. Banc of Am. Sec., LLC, 685 F. Supp. 2d 456, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), abrogatedby
Chin v. Port Auth., 685 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2012)).
141. See generally Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. at 220 ("When evidence is destroyed in bad faith
(i.e.. intentionally or willfully), that fact alone is sufficient to demonstrate relevance.").
142. See generally Victor Stanley, Inc., 269 F.R.D. at 533 (explaining that courts should
consider several elements, including the extent of prejudice and degree of culpability, when
determining the appropriate sanction for spoliation).
143. Id. at 531-32 (citing Pension Comm.. 685 F. Supp. 2d at 467).
144. See id. at 525.
145. See id. at 526.
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diligence eliminates the ability of an adversary to prove its case may
warrant case-dispositive sanctions, because the damage to the truthseeking process is absolute. Similarly, certain sanctions make no logical
sense when applied to particular breaches of the duty to preserve. For
example, an adverse inference instruction makes little logical sense if
given as a sanction for negligent breach of the duty to preserve, because
the inference that a party failed to preserve evidence because it believed
that the evidence was harmful to its case does not flow from mere
negligence-particularly if the destruction was of EST and was caused
by the automatic deletion function of a program that the party
negligently failed to disable once the duty to preserve was triggered.
The more logical inference is that the party was disorganized, or
distracted, or technically challenged, or overextended, not that it failed
to preserve evidence because of an awareness that it was harmful. In
short, matching the appropriate sanction to the spoliating conduct is
aided by remembering to whom the duty to preserve is owed.146
In some cases, prejudice may be obvious, such as the loss of the product in a
products liability action.147 But prejudice is difficult to establish if the evidence
is missing. Circumstantial evidence helps determine the extent of the prejudice
cased by the loss.148 In those cases, the prejudicial nature of the lost evidence
may be inferred by the degree of culpability of the party who lost it.149 Actions
taken in bad faith justify an inference that the party knew the evidence would be
harmful to its position or beneficial to the requesting party. This inference is the
essence of the adverse inference jury instruction, when viewed as a remedy for
the loss of primary evidence.
IV. THE SO-CALLED SAFE HARBOR OF RULE 37(E)
A.

History ofRule 37(e)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(e) provides that:
Absent exceptional circumstances, a court may not impose
sanctions under these rules on a party for failing to provide

146. Id.
147. See, e.g., Silvestri v. Gen. Motors Corp., 271 F.3d 583, 594 (4th Cir. 2001) (dismissing a
products liability action involving airbag deployment because the plaintiff failed to preserve the
automobile with the allegedly defective airbag).
148. See, e.g., Consol. Aluminum Corp. v. Alcoa, Inc., 244 F.R.D. 335, 346 (M.D. La. 2006)
(citing Concord Boat Corp. v. Brnswick Corp., No. LR C-95-781, 1997 WL 33352759, at *7
(E.D. Ark. Aug. 29, 1997)) (explaining how extrinsic evidence is needed for evidence that is
missing in order to determine if the missing evidence is prejudicial).
149. See, e.g., id. at 347 (citing Concord Boat Corp., 1997 WL 33352759, at *7-8; Zubulake
IV, 220 F.R.D. 212, 222 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)).
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electronically stored information lost as a result of the routine, goodfaith operation of an electronic information system.1o
In its 2005 report to the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure proposing the rule, the Civil Rules Advisory Committee observed that
"many database programs automatically create, discard, or update information
without specific direction from, or awareness of, users" and "the proposed rule
recognizes that such automatic features are essential to the operation of
electronic information systems."1 The Advisory Committee's report provided
examples of automated operations that would fall within the safe harbor:
Examples of [routine operations] in present systems include
programs that recycle storage media kept for brief periods against the
possibility of a disaster that broadly affects computer operations;
automatic overwriting of information that has been "deleted"; programs
that change metadata (automatically created identifying information
about the history or management of an electronic file) to reflect the
latest access to particular electronically stored information; and
programs that automatically discard information that has not been
accessed within a defined period or that exists beyond a defined period
without an affirmative effort to store it for a longer period.15
The Standing Committee, in its own report on the proposed rule
amendments addressing the discovery of ESI, echoed the Advisory Committee's
rationale for treating the loss of EST differently than the loss of traditional paper
records:
The proposed amendment to Rule 37(f) responds to a distinctive
and necessary feature of computer systems-the recycling, overwriting,
and alteration of electronically stored information that attends normal
use. This is a different problem from that presented by information kept
in the static form that paper represents; such information is not
destroyed without affirmative, conscious effort. By contrast, computer
systems lose, alter, or destroy information as part of routine operations,

150. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(e). The text now appearing as Rule 37(e) was originally added in
2006 as subsection (f), and for the first year that the Rule was in effect, it was cited as such. When
the Civil Rules were restyled in 2007, the provision became subdivision (e). See id. & committee's
note to 2006 amendment.
151. Memorandum from Hon. Lee HT.Rosenthal, Chair, Advisory Comm. on the Fed. Rules of
Civil Procedure, to Hon. David F. Levi, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure
73 (July 25, 2005). http://wvw.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/supct1105/Excerpt
CV Report.pdf [hereinafter Rosenthal Memorandum].
152. Id.
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the risk of losing information significantly greater than with

Andrea Kuperman, Chief Counsel to the Rules Committees,154 in an
exhaustively well-researched memorandum on the history and effectiveness of
Rule 37(e), observed that:
[T]he rule was intended to do something quite limited: to clarify for
courts and parties that the world of electronic discovery could not be
treated the same in terms of preservation and related sanctions as the

world of paper discovery, given the volume of electronic documents and
the fact that electronic systems operate in ways that may destroy data
unintentionally and often even without a party's knowledge. It was
meant to provide limited protection so that parties could be comforted
that they would not be sanctioned for good faith destruction done by
electronic systems. 55
It should be noted that all of the examples of automated operations listed by
the Advisory Committee involve conscious decisions made by engineers and
programmers at some point in the information system design process.
Those
decisions presumably were made long before any duty of preservation
attached-likely before there was even any relevant information to be
preserved-and for reasons entirely unrelated to any pending or anticipated
litigation.1
B. Rule 37(e) and "Auto Delete" Operations
One of the most common examples of the loss of ESI as a result of the
"routine. good-faith" operation of an electronic information system at the time
Rule 37(e) was being drafted was the automatic deletion of email after a defined
period of time, usually sixty to ninety days, or when the recipient's email

153. COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, EXCERPT FROM THE REPORT OF THE
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 13 (2005), http://wwv.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/supct
1105/Excerpt STReport CV.pdf.
154. COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE CHAIRS AND REPORTERS 2

(2011), http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Committee Membership Lists"
Members List 12 2011.pdf.
155. Advisory Comm. on Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure, Judicial Conference of the U.S.,
Report of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules (Dec. 5, 2012), in COMMITTEE ON RULES OF
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE supra note 96, at 139.
156. See Rosenthal Memorandum, supra note 151, at 73.
157. See generailly supra notes 85 89 and accompanying text (discussing when the duty to
preserve arises).

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

25

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 64, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 4
562

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 64: 53 7

account exceeded a predetermined size limitation.1 58 In Broccoli v. Echostar
Communications Corp.,159 the court was presented with one of the most
draconian automatic email deletion policies in the reported case law:
Under Echostar's extraordinary email/document retention policy,
the email system automatically sends all items in a user's "sent items"
folder over seven days old to the user's "deleted items" folder, and all
items in a user's "deleted items" folder over 14 days old are then
automatically purged from the user's "deleted items" folder. The user's
purged emails are not recorded or stored in any back up files. Thus,
when 21-day-old emails are purged, they are forever unretrievable. The
electronic files, including the contents of all folders, sub-folders, and all
email folders, of former employees are also completely deleted 30 days
after the employee leaves Echostar.160
The court declined to find that the automatic deletion policy itself
constituted sanctionable conduct. Relying on the Supreme Court's recently
issued dicta in Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States,161 the Broccoli court stated
that "under normal circumstances, such a policy may be a risky but arguably
,162
defensible business practice undeserving of sanctions."
However, Echostar's
failure to preserve clearly relevant emails and other data that existed at the time
the duty of preservation in this case arose, when it was on notice of potential
litigation arising out of the plaintiffs allegations of sexual harassment and
retaliation, was another matter. 63
Echostar clearly acted in bad faith in its failure to suspend its email and
data destruction policy or preserve essential personnel documents in
order to fulfill its duty to preserve the relevant documentation for
purposes of potential litigation. These bad faith actions prejudiced

158. See Alexander B. Hastings, Note, A Solution to the Spoliation Chaos: Rule 37(e) 's
Unfulfilled Potential to Bring Unifbrmitly to Electronic Spoliation Disputes, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
860, 873 (2011) (JN]early all companies enable their software to delete e-mails that have been sent
or received after a certain time.").
159. 229 F.R.D. 506 (D. Md. 2005).
160. Id. at 510.
161. 544 U.S. 696, 704 (2005) ('"Document retention policies,' which are created in part to
keep certain information from getting into the hands of others ... are common in business. It is. of
course, not wrongful for a manager to instruct his employees to comply with a valid document
retention policy under ordinary circumstances." (citation omitted)).
162. Broccoli, 229 F.R.D. at 510.
163. See id. ("[T]he evidence in this case amply supports the finding that Echostar was placed
on notice of potential litigation arising out of the plaintiff s allegations of sexual harassment and
retaliation as early as January 200 1").
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Broccoli in his attempts to litigate his claims and measurably increased
the costs for him to do so.164
Therefore, the action that constituted bad faith warranting sanctions was action
taken after the duty of preservation arose: failing to suspend the "risky but
arguably defensible business practice" of automatic deletion.1 65
Had Rule 37(e) been in force when Broccoli was decided, it probably would
not have changed the outcome. In Broccoli, the court stated, "[o]nce a party
reasonably anticipates litigation, it must suspend its routine document
retention/destruction policy and put in place a 'litigation hold' to ensure the
preservation of relevant documents."l 66 The Committee Note accompanying
Rule 37(f), however, states that once the duty of preservation attaches.
affirmative steps may be required to halt automatic deletion policies:
Good faith in the routine operation of an information system may
involve a party's intervention to modify or suspend certain features of
that routine operation to prevent the loss of information, if that
information is subject to a preservation obligation.... The good faith
requirement of Rule 37(f) means that a party is not permitted to exploit
the routine operation of an information system to thwart discovery
obligations by allowing that operation to continue in order to destroy
specific stored information that it is required to preserve. When a part)
is tinder a duty to preserve information because of pending or
reasonably anticipated litigation, intervention in the routine operation of
an information system is one aspect of what is often called a "litigation
hold."1 6 7
While there are inconsistencies in the interpretation of Rule 37(e)-and this
Committee Note in particular-between courts in different circuits, and even
lower courts within some circuits,168 most courts have interpreted this passage in
light of the pre-2006 case law and have considered the issuance of a litigation
hold, including the suspension of any automatic deletion, to be required indicia
of good faith, and any loss of relevant EST after the duty of preservation arises to

164. Id. at 512.
165. See id.
166. Id. at 510 (quoting Thompson v. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 219 F.R.D. 93, 100
(D. Md. 2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
167. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(f) committee's note to 2006 amendment.
168. See, e.g., Pension Comm. of the Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of Am. Sec..
LLC, 685 F. Supp. 2d 456, 464 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) ("A failure to preserve evidence resulting in the
loss or destruction of relevant information is surely negligent, and, depending on the circumstances,
may be grossly negligent or willful."), abrogatedby Chin v. Port Auth.. 685 F.3d 135, 162 (2nd Cir.
2012) ("We reject the notion that a failure to institute a 'litigation hold' constitutes gross negligence
per se.").
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be evidence of culpable conduct. 169 As a result, "federal courts have all but read
this safe harbor provision out of the rules. They have generally concluded that
once the duty to preserve arises-and it arises as soon as litigation becomes
foreseeable-any deletion of relevant data is, by definition, not in good faith."
In many of these cases, there were other indicia of culpable conduct beyond
simple negligence that led to the imposition of sanctions.
In Broccoli, for
instance, a pattern of activity resulting in the loss of key employment-related
files-far more than just employee email and ESI-led the court to conclude,
"[i]n short, the evidence of a regular policy at Echostar of 'deep-sixing'
nettlesome documents and records (and of management's efforts to avoid their
creation in the first instance) is overwhelming." 172
C. Rule 37(e) in the Fourth Circuit
In the Fourth Circuit there are only a handful of reported court opinions
applying Rule 37(e), and there is no opinion in which the Rule barred the
imposition of a sanction. 1 In some instances, this lack of guidance is because
Rule 37(e) was found not to apply at all, as no court order was implicated in the
facts to trigger a sanction "under these rules."4 In other instances, the Fourth
Circuit precedent broadly defining "willfulness" effectively negated the good
faith element of the Rule 37(e) safe harbor.
Well before Rule 37(e) was drafted, the Fourth Circuit held in Vodusek v.
Bayliner Marine Corp. that "[w]hile a finding of bad faith suffices to permit
such an [adverse inference jury instruction], it is not always necessary."1- 6 The
court went on to explain the factors that allow a court, in its discretion, to impose
that particular sanction.
First, the evidence that has been lost must appear to
"have been relevant to an issue at trial and otherwise would naturally have been
introduced into evidence."1 Second, the loss must have been the result of some

169. See Robert Hardaway et al., E-Discoverv's Threat to Civil Litigation: Reevaluating Rule
26 for the Digital Age, 63 RUTGERS L. REV. 521, 585-86 (2011) (citing Peskoff v. Faber, 244
F.R.D. 54, 60 (D.D.C. 2007): Doe v. Norwalk Cnty. Coll.. 248 F.R.D. 372. 378 (D. Conn. 2007)).
170. Id. at 566.
171. See, e.g., Broccoli, 229 F.R.D. at 511 (explaining how the defendant had a history of
burying documents).
172. Id.
173. See, e.g., Nucor Corp. v. Bell, 251 F.R.D. 191, 196 n.3 (D.S.C. 2008) (quoting FED. R.
Civ. P. 3 7(e)) (refusing to use Rule 3 7(e) to bar a sanction).
174. See, e.g., id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 3 7(e)) (stating that Rule 3 7(e) only applies to
sanctions imposed "for failing to obey a court order").
175. 71 F.3d 148 (4th Cir. 1995).
176. Id. at 156.
177. See id. (citing 2 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE. EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 285,
at 192 (James H. Chadbourn rev. 1979)).
178. Id.
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intentional conduct by the party against whom the evidence would have been
introduced.179 These two elements cannot be viewed in isolation:
An adverse inference about a party's consciousness of the weakness of
his case, however, cannot be drawn merely from his negligent loss or
destruction of evidence; the inference requires a showing that the party
knew the evidence was relevant to some issue at trial and that his willful
conduct resulted in its loss or destruction. 180
It is against this precedential backdrop that courts in the Fourth Circuit have
construed their powers under both Rule 37(e) and their inherent authority to
impose sanctions.
In Nucor Corp. v. Bell,18 1 the District Court for the District of South
Carolina found ample evidence that the defendant's actions in installing
uninstalling, and reinstalling various utility applications on his work laptop,'v
after having been served a summons in the case and after a state court had issued

a preservation order, were intentional, and "[i]t would strain credulity to believe
that defendants did not know the laptop would contain relevant evidence in this
litigation."18 The court then defined what constituted intentional actions:
A party acts intentionally if it knew the evidence would be relevant at
trial and its "willful conduct" resulted in the evidence's loss or
destruction. Thus, it is not necessary that a party intends to bring about
the loss of evidence. Rather, spoliation may be inferred when a party
intended to take those actions that caused the evidence's alteration or
destruction. Anything more (e.g., requiring that the party intended to
bring about the evidence's loss) would be tantamount to requiring bad
faith, and the Fourth Circuit has expressly rejected bad faith as an
"essential element of the spoliation rule." 84
However, the Nucor court based its imposition of sanctions not on Rule 37, but
on its inherent authority, as there had been no violation of a discovery order
entered by the court for which sanctions could be imposed "under these rules."
Pandora Jew'ielry, LLC v. Chamilia, LLCl 86 was an unfair trade practices
case in which the court imposed monetary sanctions on the defendant for its
refusal to respond to discovery requests in a timely manner and for failing to

179. See id

180. Id
181. 251 F.R.D. 191 (D.S.C. 2008).
182. See id. at 197, 198.
183. Id at 198-99.
184. Id at 198 (citations omitted) (quoting Vodusek, 71 F.3d at 156).
185. See id. at 196 n.3 (quoting FED. R. CV. P. 37(e)).

186. No. CCB-06-3041, 2008 WL 4533902 (D. Md. Sept. 30, 2008).
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produce a qualified Rule 30(b)(6) witness. 8 In considering sanctions for
spoliation, the court relied on its inherent authority, rejecting the notion that
Rule 37(e) applied:
To the extent the lack of production results from deletion of emails,
Chamilia's failure to prevent the loss does not fall within the routine,
good faith exception of Rule 37(e), which protects parties "for failing to
provide electronically stored information lost as a result of the routine,
good-faith operation of an electronic information system."189
While the court found that "it does appear that Chamilia was grossly negligent in
its failure to preserve evidence,"19 the court found neither evidence of bad
faith,191 nor that the emails alleged to have been lost would have so ported the
plaintiff's claims, and therefore declined to impose further sanctions.
In Powell v. Town of Sharpsburg,193 an employment discrimination suit, the
court found that the town's destruction of the terminated employee's work
orders, pursuant to its state-mandated document-retention policy, was "willful,"
albeit not in bad faith, noting Fourth Circuit case law indicating that "destruction
can be willful when done through an organization's document retention
policy. 194 The court distinguished between willfulness and bad faith, stating
that "[d]estruction is willful when it is deliberate or intentional," whereas bad
faith was deemed to "mean destruction for the purpose of depriving the
adversary of the evidence."
The intentionality of the act of destruction,
coupled with the centrality of the lost records to the issues in dispute, justified an
adverse inference jury instruction.196 Rule 37(e) was not raised in the opinion.
Goodman v. PraxairServices, Inc.,197 an environmental consulting contract
dispute, also dealt with the court's powers to issue sanctions for spoliation tinder
its inherent authority. 198 The CEO of the defendant's predecessor in interest,
believing she had EST relevant to the consulting project on her laptop, stopped
deleting emails she deemed to be relevant to the dispute. 199 However, no formal
litigation hold was issued.200 and the company proceeded to replace and destroy

187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

See id. at *7 (citing FED.R. Civ. P. 30(b)(7)).
See id at *8.
Id at *8 n.7 (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 3 7(e)).
Id. at *9.
See id
See id at *9-10.
591 F. Supp. 2d 814 (E.D.N.C. 2008).
Id. at 820 (citing Buckley v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 306, 323 (4th Cir. 2008)).
Id. (citingBuckley, 538 F.3d at 323).
See id. at 821.
632 F. Supp. 2d 494 (D. Md. 2009).
See id. at 506.
See id. at 502.
See id. at 502-03.
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the employee's computer, as well as those of two other important actors, when it
changed hands during the pendency of the litigation.201 The court held that,
while the failure to issue a litigation hold was negligent, the destruction of the
three computers was intentional and-while not done in "bad faith"-was done
with the knowledge that at least one of the computers still held relevant ESI.202
The combination of intentionality and knowledge that the EST was relevant
warranted an adverse inference j ury instruction.203
In Antonio v. Security Services of America, LLC. 204 African-American
plaintiffs sued the defendant for negligence and federal housing law violations
after their homes were destroyed by arson.205 The plaintiffs alleged that their
homes, which were still under construction at the time of the alleged arsons,
were targeted for destruction by employees of the defendant, who were
responsible for guarding and patrolling the homes in the subdivision until they
were completed and occupied. 206 The magistrate judge held that that the
defendant intentionally and willfully destroyed relevant ES1 when it failed to
institute a proper litigation hold and allowed its employees to self-select email
and personnel documents for deletion while it transitioned to a new computer
system. 207 The magistrate judge ordered that an adverse inference be entered
against the defendant regarding the deleted emails and personnel files responsive
208
to the plaintiffs' request.
On review, the district judge accepted the magistrate
judge's conclusion that the failure to preserve EST lost as a result of the network
conversion and destruction of the computer system was "more than gross
negligence" and could support spoliation sanctions.209 But the defendants'
limited email production, loss of personnel records, and delay in discovery
responses did not represent anything more than gross negligence, and therefore,
would not provide the basis for spoliation sanctions.10
United States v. UniversalHealth Services, Inc.2 was an action where three
employees of a social service agency alleged retaliation for providing
information to the Commonwealth of Virginia about possible Medicaid fraud.

201. See id at 503-04. 517.
202. Id at 522 (citing Pandora Jewelry. LLC v. Chamilla, LLC, No. CCB-06-3041, 2008 WL
4533902, at *9 (D. Md. Sept. 30, 2008); Sampson v. City of Cambridge, Md., 251 F.R.D. 172, 182

(D. Md. 2008)).
203. See id. at 522-23 (citing Vodusek v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 71 F.3d 148, 156 (4th Cir.
1995)).
204. 701 F. Supp. 2d 749 (D. Md. 2010), reconsidered in part by Antonio v. Sec. Servs. of
Am., LLC, No. AW 05 2982, 2010 WL 2858252 (D. Md. July 19, 2010).
205. See id. at 755-76.
206. See id. at 756.
207. See Antonio v. Sec. Servs. of Am., LLC, No. AW-05-2982, slip op. at 4. 10 (D. Md. Mar.
29, 2010).
208. See id. at *10.
209. Antonio, 2010 WL 2858252, at *5.
210. See id.
211. No. 1:07cy0000 5 4, 2011 WL 3426046 (W.D. Va. Aug. 5, 2011).
212. See id. at *1.
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The defendants moved to compel production of documents from several state
agencies.21 Although the underlying qui tam action was filed in 2007, and the
government gave notice to the court of its election to intervene in late 2009, " at
least one state agency did not receive a litigation hold notice until April 2010,
several months after the agency had converted to a new computer system. 215 At
that point, the responsive EST could have been obtained only from backup media
or forensic images of agency employees' computers, none of which were
reasonably accessible.216 The defendant requested that the Commonwealth be
compelled to produce the requested EST or, in the alternative, be sanctioned with
an adverse inference jury instruction.
The court noted that the
Commonwealth, without providing any credible reason, failed to institute a
litigation hold for two years after it made the decision to intervene in the qui tam
action with a potential recovery of $10 million. 8 "Thus, a portion of the
electronically stored information at issue in this Motion became less accessible
based on the Commonwealth's own negligent failure to take steps to adequately
preserve relevant information and not as a result of the routine, good-faith
operation of an electronic information system." 1 The court ordered the
Commonwealth to produce the backup media and forensic images to a qualified
commercial vendor for retrieval of responsive files without discussing the
alternative of imposing an adverse inference jury instruction.
In one very recent decision, a trial court in the Fourth Circuit declined to
impose sanctions for the failure to preserve EST lost due to the routine, goodfaith operation of an electronic information system after a duty of preservation
had arisen. This decision could serve as a textbook example of the application of
Rule 37(e) exactly as its drafters had intended, but for the fact that neither Rule
37(e) nor any other rule is cited relative to the court's discussion of spoliation.
Simms v. Deggeller Attractions, Inc.221 was a personal injury suit brought by
three teenagers injured on a roller coaster when the car that they were riding in
suddenly stopped and was rear-ended by a second car.
The defendant operator
counterclaimed against one of the teenagers, alleging that he had been told to
remove his baseball cap while riding and had failed to do so, resulting in the cap

213. See id.
214. Id.
215. See id at *2 (citing Affidavit of John Willinger at 2. Universal Health Servs.. No.
1:07cv000054).
216. See id. at *2-3 (citing Affidavit of John Willinger, supra note 215, at 3-4).
217. Id at *4.
218. Id at *5, *6.
219. Id. at *5.
220. See id. at *6.
221. Nos. 7:12-cv-00038, 7:12-cy-00039, 7:12-cv-00161, 2013 WL 49756, 2013 WL 49756
(W.D. Va. Jan. 2. 2013).
222. See id. at * I (citing Complaint at 2, Goad ex rel. Goad v. Degeller Attractions, Inc., No.
7-12-cv-161 (W.D. Va. Jan. 2, 2013)).
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flying off and becoming wedged in the car's brake mechanism.
The defendant
produced photographs of the teenager riding with his cap on and of the crushed
cap, with blue paint stains matching the blue paint of the roller coaster's rails.224
The plaintiffs disputed the defendant's allegations and demanded additional
photographs from the roller coaster's integrated photography system that would
show other passengers wearing caps while riding the roller coaster that same
day.2 The defendant could not produce any additional photographs, explaining
that "the photographs 'are temporarily stored electronically and displayed for
riders to view after they have completed the ride.' If an image is not purchased,
'the old photographs are deleted automatically as the new photographs are

taken."'

226

Although the defendant itself had preserved photographs of the plaintiff, the
court declined to find that the defendant had willfully allowed other photographs
from that day to be destroyed:
While the fact that a collision occurred may have alerted Deggeller to
the possibility that a lawsuit for injuries might be filed at some point, the
Court is not convinced, absent evidence of knowledge or wrongdoing,
that employees of Deggeller knew-on July 3, 2011 -that photographs
of other riders wearing hats would be material to a lawsuit that had not
yet been filed.
The court left open the possibility that the plaintiffs could renew their motion for
sanctions if evidence of willful conduct on the part of the defendant were to be
discovered. 2
These decisions on spoliation of EST illustrate how narrow and rocky the
Rule 37(e) "safe harbor" is. To invoke Rule 37(e), the court first must be acting
pursuant to its powers under the rules, as opposed to its inherent authority. 229In
most of the cases discussed above, the court was either acting outside the scope
of Rule 37 entirely, as no order to compel production or to preserve EST was
implicated, or considering actions that took place before suit was filed.

223. Id.
224. Id.
225. See id. at *5.
226. Id. (citations omitted).

227. Id. at *6.
228. See id.
229. See, e.g., Nucor Corp. v. Bell, 251 F.R.D. 191, 196 n.3 (D.S.C. 2008) (quoting FED. R.
Civ. P. 3 7(e)) ("Rule 37(e)'s plain language states that it only applies to sanctions imposed under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure .... ").
230. See, e.g., Sinms, 2013 WL 49756, at *6 (discussing actions that took place prior to the
defendant knowing about the filing of the lawsuit); Pandora Jewelry, LLC v. Chamilla, LLC, No.
CCB-06-3041, 2008 WL 4533902, at *8 n.7 (D. Md. Sept. 30, 2008) (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 37(e))
(finding Rule 37 (e) inapplicable); Nucor Cotp., 251 F.R.D. at 196 n.3 (invoking sanctions under the
courts inherent authoritv rather than under Rule 37(e)).
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Second, the loss of discoverable ESI must have been "a result of the routine,
good-faith operation of an electronic information System."231 Most of the cases
discussed above involved extraordinary activity, such as migrating to a new
computer system, outside of the context of well-established, routine business
-232
practices.
The two cases in which the operation of a routine electronic information
system resulted in the loss of discoverable ESI-neither of which applied Rule
37(e)-reached different results. However, these different outcomes can be
explained under Fourth Circuit law.
In Powell v. Town of Sharpsburg, the failure to sus end the document
destruction schedule was deemed willful but not in bad faith.
The work orders
that were destroyed "relate[d] directly to plaintiffs claim of discriminatory
discipline and defendant's apparent defense of deficient performance by
plaintiff. ,235 The court concluded that the "defendant knew or should have
known that the work orders would be relevant to any action brought by plaintiff
against it relating to his employment."236 This knowledge of relevance elevated
the act of destruction from intentional to "willful," as defined by the Fourth
Circuit,237 dispensing with the necessity for a finding of bad faith to justify the
20
- 238
adverse inference jury instruction,
as might be required in other circuits.
In
Simms, the court imputed no such knowledge of relevance to the defendant,
negating the allegation that the destruction was willful, even though a duty of
preservation may have been triggered and the lost evidence was later deemed to
be relevant.240
D.

Navigating PastRule 3 7(e)

An analysis of these cases from the Fourth Circuit indicates that the
navigation hazards in the Rule 37(e) "safe harbor" are not whether the duty of
preservation had been triggered before the destruction of the ESI, or whether the
party had instituted a timely litigation hold, but whether the party knew or should

231. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(e).
232. See, e.g., United States v. Universal Health Servs. Inc.. No. 1:07cy000054, 2011 WL
3426046, at *5 (W.D. Va. Aug. 5. 2011) (discussing retrieval of old email files);- Antonio v. Sec.
Servs. of Am., LLC, No. AW 05 2982, 2010 WL 2858252, at *4 (D. Md. July 19, 2010) (stating
that defendant "destroyed the computer and converted the network").
233. 591 F. Supp. 2d 814 (E.D.N.C. 2008).
234. See id. at 821.
235. Id. at 817.
236. Id. at 819.
237. Vodusek v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 71 F.3d 148. 156 (4th Cir. 1995).
238. See Poiell.591 F. Supp. 2d at 820 (citing Buckley v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 306, 323 (4th
Cir. 2008)).
239. See, e.g., Micron Tech., Inc. v. Rambus Inc., 645 F.3d 1311, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ("A
determination of bad faith is normally a prerequisite to the imposition of dispositive sanctions for
spoliation under the district court's inherent power ...
).
240. See Siuns. 2013 WL 49756. at *6.
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have known that the lost ESI would likely be subject to discovery in pending or
reasonably anticipated litigation. It is that knowledge that elevates an intentional
act of destruction pursuant to a "routine, good-faith operation of an electronic
information system"241 to a "willful" act subject to spoliation sanctions.242 And
it is this insight into Rule 37(e), and spoliation analysis in general, that provides
a chart for navigating between the threat of sanctions for the failure to preserve
and the enormous cost and burden of the "keep everything" approach.2
This conclusion is in accord with current efforts to amend Rule 37(e)2 44
replacing it entirely with a more comprehensive rule that covers spoliation in
general and is not limited in scope to the loss of ESI, "the result of the routine,
good-faith operation of an electronic information system," or consideration of
sanctions "under these rules."245 As discussed in Part III.B.3. above, the
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules approved the text of a proposed new Rule
37(e) in November 2012, and presented it to the Standinf Committee on Rules of
Practice and Procedure at its meeting in January 2013.2 It is important to note
that the language of proposed Rule 37(e)(3)(B) changed considerably in the fall
of 2012.2
Going into the Civil Rules Advisory Committee meeting in
November, the proposed language was: "the reasonableness of the party's efforts
to preserve the information, including the use of a litigation hold and the scope
of the preservation efforts."m By December 5, when the Advisory Committee
formally transmitted its proposal to the Standing Committee, that particular
clause had been shortened considerably to remove the phrase "including the use
of a litigation hold and the scope of the preservation efforts."24
The proposed Committee Note discusses Rule 37(e)(3)(B) as the second
relevant factor in courts' consideration of sanctions, saying:
The second factor focuses on what the party did to preserve
information after the prospect of litigation arose. The party's issuance
of a litigation hold is often important on this point. But it is only one

241. FED. R. Cil. P. 37(e).
242. See Siuns, 2013 WL 49756, at *6.
243. See, e.g., Bennett B. Borden et al., Four Years Later: How the 2006 Amendments to the
Federal Rules Have Reshaped the E-Discovery Landscape and Are Revitalizing the Civil Justice
System, RICH. J.L. & 'TECH., Fall 2010, at 1, 4 ("The immense volume of potentially relevant
evidence has driven the cost of finding, reviewing, and producing that information to unprecedented
heights, threatening the very purposes of our civil justice system.").
244. See supra notes 93-101 and accompanying text.
245. FED. R. Ci. P. 37(e).
246. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
247. See generally Advisory Comm. on Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure, Judicial Conference of
the U.S., supra note 96, at 127 (illustrating how the change originally listed "the reasonableness of
the party's efforts to preserve the information," as well as two additional factors, as issues for
consideration in spoliation matters under Rule 37(e)(3)(B)), but then the Subcommittee decided to
strike the two additional factors).
248. See id.
249. See id. at 103-04.
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consideration, and no specific feature of the litigation hold-for
example, a written rather than an oral hold notice-is dispositive.
Instead, the scope and content of the party's overall preservation efforts

should be scrutinized.... The fact that some information was lost does
not itself prove that the efforts to preserve were not reasonable.250
With this action, the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules may be signaling
that it is time to clear the mines in the Rule 37(e) "safe harbor" and allow for
more reasonable course charting.

V.

RISK AVERSION V. RISK MANAGEMENT

A.

Law School Trainingv. Business School Training

Those of us with fond memories of law school may have a sense of humor
that tends towards the macabre. Day after day, in contracts, torts, criminal law,
and even civil procedure classes, we were taught using Dean Langdell's famous
casebook method. which is based on a thorough analysis of exemplary court
'51
decisions to derive the underlying legal principles and see them in action.
But
each of these judicial opinions we studied, by virtue of the fact that they were the
culmination of an adjudication of a "case or controversy," represented the post
mortem of a business, personal, or societal relationship gone awry, to the point
that the parties required court intervention to sort things out.
Three years of
reading and listening to such horror stories prepares one for entry in a legal
culture in which risk aversion is understandably the dominant trait.
By contrast, our peers in the graduate business school were being taught
with the "case method": they were presented with detailed background
information on a business problem or op ortunity and required to make
decisions to achieve the most optimal result. P The goal of this method is to
produce graduates suited for a business culture in which well-thought-out risk
254
taking is encouraged.
In the real world, the representatives of these two cultures must work
together, and as a general proposition, they do. Entrepreneurs and lawyers craft
deals together and govern businesses that make profits and comply with the law.
Lawyers often become business people themselves, joining corporations,
institutions, and government agencies, and becoming immersed in the
organizational culture; conversely, they may start their own businesses, drawing

250. Id. at 108.
251. See Arthur D. Austin, Is the Casebook Method Obsolete?, 6 WMy. & MARY L. REv. 157,
157, 160 (1965).
252. See id. at 157.
253. See Benjamin H. Barton, A Tale of Two Case Methods, 75 TENN. L. REV. 233. 235-36
(2008) (citing DAVID W. EWING, INSIDE THE HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL 20 (1990)).
254. See id.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol64/iss3/4

36

Withers: Risk Aversion, Risk Management, and the "Overpreservation" Prolbe
2013]

OVERPRESERVATION IN ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY

573

on their own entrepreneurial skill and spirit-assuming it was not beaten out of
them in law school. 2
But business people tend not to cross over into the
practice of law and generally do their best to avoid litigation. That is almost
exclusively the realm of the lawyers, and in that realm it should be no surprise
that risk-aversion rules, particularly when it comes to preservation
decisionmaking. 56 The lawyers view this using the casebook method they were
taught in law school, and a business-school-style analysis that emphasizes risk
management, as opposed to risk aversion, is foreign to them.257
This assertion is not to say that, as a whole, the law frowns on risk
management. On the contrary, as a matter of substantive law, risk management
analysis is encouraged. The most prominent expression of this risk management
consideration is the business judgment rule.
B. Importing the Business Judgment Rule into Preservation
The business judgment rule is a common law doctrine, a standard of due
care, classically stated by the American Law Institute as:
(c) A director or officer who makes a business judgment in good
faith fulfills the duty [of care] tinder this Section if the director or
officer:
(1) is not interested . . . in the subject of the business judgment;

(2) is informed with respect to the subject of the business judgment
to the extent the director or officer reasonably believes to be
appropriate under the circumstances; and
(3) rationally believes that the business judgment is in the best
interests of the corporation.
While the burden is placed on the directors or officers to demonstrate that the
elements of good faith have been met, once that burden is fulfilled, American
Law Institute Principle 401(c) acts essentially as a safe harbor.259

255. Cf Thomas K. Byerley, WIearing Tivo Hats: Lawyers Who Also Practice in Other
Professions, MICH. B.J., Jan. 2000, at 74, 74 (listing the various other occupations lawyers may
hold).
256. See Robert J. Rhee, On Legal Education and Reform: One View Formedfrom Diverse
Perspectives, 70 MD. L. REv. 310, 326 (2011).
257. See generally Barton, supra note 253, at 236 (describing management skills as a skill
students gain in business school that is not taught in law school).
ANALYSIS AND RECOMNIEN7DATIONS
258. 1 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
§ 4.01(c) (1992) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE].

259. See Douglas M. Branson, The Rule That Isn t a Rule-The Business Judgment Rule, 36
VAL. U. L. REV. 631. 636 (2002).
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Delaware courts, which pioneered the business judgment rule, state it
slightly differently as "a presumption that in making a business decision the
directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the
honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company."260
By formulating the rule as a presumption, the burden shifts to the party seekinq
liability to come forward with evidence that the presumption should not apply.
In addition to providing a rule of law to be applied in particular cases, the
business judgment rule serves broader policy functions. First, the rule conserves
judicial resources by requiring some threshold showing before allowing a fullblown inquiry into the motivations behind, or objective "reasonableness" of, an
officer's or director's actions.262 Perhaps more importantly, the rule allows
individuals to make business decisions with some assurance a court will not
routinely second-guess their actions:
The business judgment rule now more than ever is necessary to
encourage truly independent persons to serve as directors. "[Persons] of
reason, intellect and integrity would not serve if the law exacted from
them a degree of prescience not possessed by others." Once on the
board, a strong business judgment rule is necessary to encourage those
independent directors to engage in the type of informed risk taking that
is essential to business success.263
The business judgment rule was originally developed in the context of
shareholder derivative actions to address the appropriate standard of review to be
applied to the decision of corporate directors and officers to forebear from
264
pursuing the stockholder's claim on behalf of the corporation.
But business
judgment rule analysis has been extended to other areas of corporate
decisionmaking, such as a board's response to a takeover bid,265 a board's
decision to grant an allegedly overgenerous severance package to a departing
266
CEO,
and a network television upper management's racially motivated
-- 267
programming decisions.

260. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (citing Kaplan v. Centex Corp., 284
A.2d 119, 124 (Del. Ch. 1971): Robinson v. Pittsburgh Oil Ref. Corp., 126 A. 46, 49 (Del. Ch.
1924)), overruled on other grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).
261. See Branson, supra note 259, at 635.
262. See id
263. Id at 637 (quoting S. Samuel Arsht. The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 IOFSTRA
L. REV. 93, 97 (1979)).
264. See Arsht, supra note 263, at 95.
265. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985).
266. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d 342, 350, 353-54 (Del. Ch. 1998)
(citing Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 814 (Del. 1984), overruled on other grounds by Brehm v.
Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000)), aff'd inpart,rev'd inpart,Brehm, 746 A.2d 244.
267. See Leonard M. Baynes, Racial Stereotypes, Broadcast Corporations, and the Business
Judgment Rule, 37 U. RICH. L. REV. 819, 898 (2003).
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While the business judgment rule originally provided courts with guidance
in considering a corporate board's decision not to pursue litigation,268 the policy
considerations behind the rule apply equally to decisions by management-at
any appropriate level in the corporate hierarchy-to establish and maintain an
information governance program that rationally considers both the risks and
costs of preservation.
C. Applying the Business Judgment Rule to Preservation
The three essential elements of the business judgment rule are that the
decisionmaker be independent, in that the individual does not have an
inappropriate personal interest in the outcome; that the decisionmaker be armed
with the facts necessary to make an informed judgment; and that the judgment be
made on the basis of the best interests of the business.269 Whether or not the
decision, in hindsight, was objectively the best decision or was the decision that
a judge or jury would have made is immaterial, assuming that the business is
willing to live up to the consequences of that decision.
For instance, management may decide that it is in the business's best interest
to hire a celebrity sports figure as a spokesperson and pay him a princely sum of
money. If that celebrity spokesperson is later arrested for unlawful use of
steroids, the stockholders may regret the management's decision; but if that
decision met the requirements of the business judgment rule, the decision itself is
not open to legal challenge.27 1 That does not absolve the business from the
consequences of its decision; it must accept the risks associated with hiring a
sports celebrity.
It can (and should) mitigate those risks by thoroughly vetting
the spokesperson before offering the contract and by inserting a "morals clause"
in the contract itself,273 but there will always be some risk that the spokesperson
will end up costing the business money or goodwill that cannot be fully
recovered.

268. See Arsht, supra note 263, at 100.
269. See PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE. supra note 258, at § 4.01(c).
270. See, e.g., Brehm v. Eisner (In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig.), 906 A.2d 27, 56, 60
(Del. 2006) (approving the Court of Chancery's finding that, though corporate processes did not
meet the "best practices" standard, the operations still did not violate the duty of care).
271. Cf Pinnacle Labs, LLC v. Goldberg, No. 07-C-196-S. 2007 WL 2572275, at *5 (W.D.
Wis. Sept. 5, 2007) (listing certain protected decisions that "are typical difficult choices which
managers of a cash strapped enterprise must make and which are not subject to legal challenge with
the benefit of hindsight").
272. Cf, e.g., Emily Jane Fox & Chris Isidore, Nike Ends Contracts with Lance Armstrong,
CNNMONEY (Oct. 17, 2012. 3:02 PM). http:/ money. cnn. com/2012/10/17 news/companies/nikelance-armstrong/index.html (discussing endorsements cyclist Lance Armstrong lost after the United
States Anti-Doping Agency reported certain doping allegations made against the athlete).
273. Cf, e.g., Darren Heitner, Nike's Disassociationfi-om Lance .Armfistrong fakes Nike a
Stronger Brand, FORBES (Oct. 17. 2012. 10:22 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/darrenheitner
/2012/10/I17/nikes-disassociation-tiom-lance-armstrong-nakes-nike-a-stronger-brand/ (discussing the
"morals clause" in Lance Armstrong's contract with Nike).

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

39

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 64, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 4
576

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 64: 537

The same can be said of adopting an enterprise-wide information
governance program that includes litigation response and preservation:
There is nothing necessarily improper about a company's reasonable
pre-litigation document retention policy whereby documents are
disposed of in periodic intervals.
Generally speaking, spoliation
arguments are unsuccessful if relevant documents were destroyed in
accordance with the business'[s] reasonable document retention policy
and/or practices. However, even a reasonable practice of destroying
documents may have unintended consequences.
Setting aside the level of risk that can be considered acceptable in adopting
an information governance program, can we establish a program that meets the
requirements of the business judgment rule, such that the program itself would
not be considered improper, and the risks are isolated from any possible adverse
consequences?
The first and third elements of the business judgment rule can be met by
having decisionmakers involved who do not have personal stakes in the outcome
and who are motivated by legitimate business interest.
In the context of an
information governance program that involves a significant litigation response
element, this requirement may mean removing from the process-or
appropriately limiting involvement in the process-those who might have a
financial or reputational stake in the outcome. That would include internal
business units or outside contractors who stand to profit from the collection,
processing, and storage of information that is not needed for a legitimate
business purpose. It may mean keeping outside litigation counsel at a respectful
arm's length. While their advice and counsel, based on their experience and
knowledge of the law, can and should be sought, their immediate litigation needs
should not drive the process.
Likewise, the development and implementation of an information
governance program should not be conducted under the cloud of pending
litigation or the threat of reasonably anticipated litigation. That may be
impossible for some organizations, in which case the organization must ensure
that reasonable steps have been taken to meet current preservation obligations.
Otherwise the process of developing and implementing an information
governance program may be viewed as tainted with self-interest in avoiding
discovery.276

274. Peter Kiewit Sons', Inc., v. Wall St. Equity Grp., Inc., No. 8:10CV365, 2011 WL
5075720, at *5 (D. Neb. Oct. 25, 2011) (citation omitted).
275. See PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE. supra note 258, at §4.01(c)(1). (3).
276. See, e.g., Mircon Tech., Inc. v. Rambus Inc.. No. 00-792-SLR. slip op. at 26-27 (D. Del.
Jan. 2, 2013) ("Such conduct by Rambus is sufficient to evince knowledge on Rambus' part that its
document destruction was an improper attempt to gain a litigation advantage.").
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The second element of the business judgment rule involves gathering and
analyzing the facts necessary to make a reasoned decision regarding information
governance.
Each organization will need to devote the necessary resources to
assess its own situation, and there is no "one size fits all information
governance program; however, a strong case can be made for a document
retention policy, as part of an overall information governance program, that
features very tight definitions of what is considered a "business record" and very
short retention periods.278 The starting point for building such a policy is a
presumption that all information and records are to be routinely destroyed, unless
a business case can be made for retention, and in those situations, retention
should be for the shortest period necessary.
A very easy business case can immediately be made for all communications
and records which law or regulation requires to be retained for defined periods of
time, such as tax, employment, and envirommental records, or broker-dealer
communications the Securities and Exchange Commission regulates.279 Here,
the keys will be to catalog these requirements thoroughly, organize the
business's files for easy identification and management, and minimize
duplication and proliferation in the information management system.
A more nuanced business case, but a necessary one, must be made for
routine communications and records that serve a bona fide business purpose,
such as contracts, invoices, and personnel records.280 For each of these many
categories of records-and there could be thousands-the information
governance policy must be governed by actual experience, and not by tradition.
For instance, a business may have an existing policy of keeping maintenance
work orders for five years, but a study of businesses may indicate that they are
rarely, if ever, consulted after one year. If there is no business purpose for
keeping them, they should be disposed of. In Peter Kiewit Sons', Inc. v. Wfall
Street Equity Group, Inc.281 the court considered, without objection, a policy in
which all communications with potential customers regarding sales were
routinely destroyed if the sale was not consummated. 8

277. See PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 258, at § 4.0 1(c)(2).
278. While the definition of a "business record" is up to the enterprise to formulate and
articulate in its retention policy, the Federal Rules of Evidence provide useful guidance in
describing business records for the purposes of admissibility and to overcome the hearsay objection.
See generally Rambus, Inc., v. Infimeon Techs. AG, 348 F. Supp. 2d 698, 704 (E.D. Va. 2004)
(quoting United States v. Wells. 262 F.3d 455. 462 n.8 (5th Cir. 2001); United States v. Foster. 711
F.2d 871, 882 (9th Cir. 1983)) (noting the different standards for business records among federal
circuits).
279. See, e.g., Self-Regulatory Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-66681. at 21-22
(Mar. 29, 2012). http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/finra/2012/34-66681.pdf (discussing proposed rule
changes regarding regulation of broker-dealer communications).
280. See generally Rambus, Inc., 348 F. Supp. 2d at 704 (quoting Wells, 262 F.3d at 462 n.8;
Foster, 711 F.2d at 882) (noting different definitions of when business records are "considered kept
in the ordinary course of business" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
281. No. 8:10CV365, 2011 WL 5075720 (D. Neb. Oct."2, 2011).
282. See id. at *5.
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As business transitions to all electronic record systems, there is a temptation
to keep everything because the physical storage problem has been eliminated.
However, the transition should instead be viewed as an opportunity to keep a
cleaner house, as the electronic business process can more easily be designed to
accommodate routine and automatic deletion, with appropriate safeguards built
in to meet unforeseen future retention or preservation obligations.
This
possibility is one aspect of "records management by design."
Perhaps the largest categories of information held by businesses that serve
no long term business purpose, that are not governed by any statutory or
regulatory retention requirement, and that represent only potential cost and
burden if subject to a duty of preservation, are the cases of redundant ESI found
on employee desktops, shared drives, offline storage, and legacy system
The information-technology (IT) department should be provided with
media.
the resources and appropriate guidance to trim down storage of redundant ESI, if
not eliminate them entirely going forward, by implementing an IT architecture
that seeks out and destroys unnecessary duplicate files, or better yet, never
creates them. In addition, disaster-recovery systems should be designed with
data minimization as a goal. There is no business purpose for keeping disasterrecovery backup data any longer than it takes to overwrite it with more current
data on a real-time basis.
The examples of ways that businesses can reduce their data footprint are
boundless and beyond the scope of this Article. But before the information
governance program can be formulated, due consideration must also be paid to
the risk of data loss, particularly the risk of violating the duty of preservation and
incurring sanctions. It is well-established that a document retention policyeven a draconian one-does not, in and of itself, justify any spoliation
sanction. 5 For a sanction to be imposed, the elements of spoliation must be
met, and the policy should address each one to minimize that risk.86
28
The first element is a determination that a duty of preservation has arisen. 2
If the document retention policy is in place before there is any reasonable
anticipation of litigation, this risk is minimized.288 For those businesses that face
ongoing litigation, the policy may be limited to data generated on a going-

283. See, e.g., SYMANTEC, SYMANTEC 2010 INFORMATION MANAGEMENT HEALTH CHECK

GLOBAL RESULTS 9 (2010), http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/about/media/pdfs/symantec
2010 information management health check report global.pdf (recommending that companies
create a "formal plan" for data retention).
284. See generally Withers, supra note 17, at 174 (discussing how replicated ES] causes a
"tremendous volume" of information on a computer system).
285. See Micron Techs., Inc. v. Rambus Inc., 645 F.3d 1311, 1319-20 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing
Arthur Andersen. LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 704 (2005); Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. 212,
216 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)).
286. See generallyZubulake 11, 220 F.R.D. at 220 (citing Byrme v. Town of Cromwell. Bd. of
Educ., 243 F.3d 93, 107-11 (2d Cir. 2001)) (listing the elements of spoliation).
287. See id. (quoting Byrnie, 243 F.3d at 107).
288. See supra note 276 and accompanying text.
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forward basis or steps taken to assure that information already subject to a duty
of preservation has been identified and preserved.
The second element is the "culpable state of mind."289 This consideration is
not relevant for decisions made before there is a reasonable anticipation of
litigation.290 After a duty has arisen, as the case law strongly suggests, the
culpable state of mind necessary to support a sanction for spoliation need only be
the intentional act of continuing to administer the policy, without
implementation of any litigation hold.291 Therefore, to minimize risk, the
business must have in place a system for the prompt implementation of litigation
holds, including clear internal communications, a chain of command,
decisionmaking authority, and a preestablished litigation hold procedure flexible
enough to meet a variety of situations.
Think of this as similar to an
emergency evacuation procedure in case of fire-no responsible business should
be without one.
The third element in the spoliation analysis is relevance.293 In the context of
minimizing risks inherent in the document retention policy, this means having
well-organized, transparent indexing systems to quickly locate relevant data, and
avoid capturing irrelevant data, or automated search technologies capable of
identifying relevant data across the business's entire information system. 9
The fourth element in the spoliation analysis is prejudice, which for the
purposes of minimizing risk in the tight document retention policy, can be
addressed through relevance. 2 If the information management system is able to
accurately identify the data relevant to a given need, the risk that any loss of data
will be prejudicial to the opposing party in litigation is minimal.
These sorts of risk minimization steps cannot guarantee that no information
subject to a duty of preservation will ever be lost, nor do they represent any "safe
harbor" or "get out of jail free" card for businesses that choose to implement
them. And they do not come without cost. They require significant investment
in information-technology infrastructure, employee training, and proactive legal
analysis. But when weighed against the costs of endemic overpreservation, a

289. Zubulake IV. 220 F.R.D. at 220 (quoting Byrnie, 243 F.3d at 109).
290. See Silvestri v. Gen. Motors Corp., 271 F.3d 583. 591 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing Kronisch v.
United States, 150 F.3d 112, 126 (2d Cir. 1998)).
291. See, e.g., Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. at 220 ("Once the duty to preserv e attaches, any
destruction of documents is, at a minimum, negligent."); see also E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v.
Kolon Indus., Inc., 803 F. Supp. 2d 469, 497 (E.D. Va. 2011) ("In the Fourth Circuit, any level of
fault, whether it is bad faith, willfulness, gross negligence, or ordinary negligence, suffices to
support a finding of spoliation.").
292. Cf Thomas Y. Allman, The Impact of the Proposed Federal E -Discovery Rules, RICH.
J.L. & TECH., Spring 2006, at 1, 25 (noting the importance ofan "innovative" and flexible approach
to litigation holds).
293. See Zubulake IV". 220 F.R.D. at 220 (citing Byrnie, 243 F.3d at 109).
294. See Gregory D. Shelton, ProvidingCompetent Representation in the DigitalInformation
Age, 74 DEF. COUNS. J. 261, 265 (2007).
295. See Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc., 269 F.R.D. 497, 532 (D. Md. 2010).
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business may well decide that the necessary investment in risk management is
far less costly than the burden of conventional risk avoidance.
VI. CONCLUSION
The combination of the volume and dispersion of data with the numbing fear
of sanctions, based on the confusing and contradictory case law, has led to a
failure of the legal community to properly advise clients on their retention and
preservation obligations. Instead of providing clients with sound analysis of the
costs, benefits, and risks of instituting and maintaining disciplined ESI retention
and destruction programs, many lawyers-both in-house counsel and retained
attorneys-opt for a costly, risk-averse "keep everything" approach to data
management. But a closer analysis of the case law-and an appreciation for
where that law is heading-provides the basis for a risk-management approach
that realistically assesses the need to collect, manage, and store ESI for business
purposes; minimizes the amount of data that is kept when it no longer has a
business purpose; quantifies the risk of noncompliance with preservation
obligations in light of the case law; and makes a sensible business j udgment that
includes an acceptable level of risk.
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